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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballisti.c missiles is now one 
of the greatest threats to the United States and its allies. Efforts to contain W:MD 
proliferation, particularly the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), have had 
limited success and must be improved to deal with new arms proliferation challenges. 
This thesis examines the case of Iraq to assess the performance of the missile 
nonproliferation regime since 1970. By providing a detailed analysis of the methods used 
by Iraq to obtain missile systems and missile technology, this thesis assesses the ability 
of the international community to prevent ballistic missile proliferation. Understanding 
Iraq's past capabilities as well as its post-war efforts to rebuild weapons programs and 
procurement networks, this thesis provides suggestions for improving the regime's 
performance. 
This thesis finds that ( 1) prior to 1992 the MTCR failed in its attempts to prevent 
proliferation; (2) the existence of the MTCR, while necessary to slow proliferation, is not 
sufficient to prevent proliferation; and (3) additional enforcement is needed to counter 
W:MD acquisition by resourceful and determined states. 
v 
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The quest for nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and the missiles 
to deliver them creates serious challenges to U.S. interests around the world. Proliferation 
trends indicate that the number of nations with extensive WMD and missile programs will 
smpass thirty by the year 2000 and the level of sophistication of these programs will also 
continue to increase. Recent experience shows that the proliferation of these weapons 
produces serious regional instability· and that initiating controls on these weapons is vital 
to ensure the ability of the United States to influence its allies and dominate its enemies. 
The Gulf War also provides many lessons pertaining to WMD and missiles, including the 
vulnerability of otherwise dominate U.S. military forces and our inability to target, destroy 
and defend against these weapons. 
International arms control agreements have proven to be insufficient to prevent the 
spread of these weapons. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is designed 
to limit the spread of missile systems and missile technology. It has experienced periods 
of great success and disastrous failure. Although U.S. pressure has drasticly increased the 
membership, the MTCR contains inherent V¥"eaknesses the will ultimately confine the 
abilities of the regime. 
The case of Iraq provides excellent examples of the limitations of arms control 
agreements. Combining seemingly unlimited resources with unwavering determination 
and increasingly cooperative suppliers, a situation was created where the current WMD 
control agreements were overwhelmed and ignored. A comprehensive study of the 
X1 
evolution Iraq•s ballistic missile program provides a exhaustive evaluation of both the 
strengths and weaknesses of the missile nonproliferation regime and provides insight into 
the necessary changes to increase the regimes ability to prevent proliferation. 
The research in this thesis charts the objectives and intentions of the missile 
nonproliferation regime, then describes the evolution of Iraq•s ballistic missile program. 
Tracing its origins to the early 1970s, this thesis provides examples of exactly how the 
Iraqis were able to acquire vast amounts of missile technology from a number countries. 
Assessing Iraq•s pre-war missile capabilities and the efforts of the U.S. and the UN to 
limit Iraqi proliferation, this paper highlights many examples that will surface again in 
future proliferation scenarios. Finally an examination of Iraq•s current capabilities and 
their ability to rebuild their programs despite serious international pressure and monitoring 
illustrates the need for immediate strengthening of the regime before future proliferation 
problems occur. 
The United States can not stop the spread the WMD and ballistic missiles alone. 
The findings of this thesis show that additional efforts to the current regime are necessary 
for success. Economic sanctions, UN led monitoring and the threat of preventative war 
are just a few of the actions that may be 11ecessary to prevent proliferation. If the 
international community is serious about limiting the spread of WMD and missiles, drastic 
must be taken to prove that they are united in their commitment to preventing 
proliferation. 
Xll 
L PREVENTING BAUJSTIC MISSll.E PROLIFERATION 
We received a wake-up call with Saddam Hussein's use of SCUD missiles 
during Operation Desert Storm and the new information on his ambitious 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs. The proliferation of 
these horrific weapons presents a grave and urgent risk to the United States 
and our citizens, allies, and troops abroad. Reduction of this risk is an 
absolute priority of the United States.1 [William Perry, 1996] 
A. BACKGROUND 
Recent conflicts demonstrate the seriousness of WMD proliferation and show that 
controls on these weapons are not as effective as once believed. Most notably, the Gulf 
War displayed the vulnerability of large powers to WMD use. The concern over the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles, although at the forefront of current national security 
issues, is not a new problem. For the last two decades ballistic missile technology has 
spread to developing countries at an alarming rate. Although not a new problem, the 
continued spread of missile technology poses a growing challenge to U.S. policy makers. 
The U.S. intelligence community believes that: 
1. The proliferation of ballistic missiles is significant and growing, both in terms 
of missiles and in terms of technical capabilities of those missiles; 
2. The trends in missile proliferation is towards longer range and more 
sophisticated missiles; 
3. A determined country can acquire an ICBM, and with little warning, by 
means of other than indigenous development; 
1William J. Perry, Proliferation Threat and Response, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Goverment 
Printing Office), iii. 
1 
4. The North Koreans may deploy an ICBM capable of reaching the United 
States within five years. 
Most of the developed countries and more than twenty Third World countries 
already possess surface-to-surface missiles or are in the process of developing them? 
Current trends suggest that the number of countries with missile programs will increase 
in the latter half of the 1990s and that the capabilities of these systems will also become 
more sophisticated. The future of missile proliferation is particularly important for the 
United States. This is so because ballistic missiles have the ability to successfully 
penetrate U.S. air superiority, regional proliferation of ballistic missiles will play an 
increasing role in determining when and how the United States involves itself in future 
conflicts. In addition, ballistic missiles of developing countries will eventually have the 
ability to reach the continental United States. As opposed to the Cold War threat from 
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, the widespread dispersion of missile systems to 
unstable Third World nations will force the United States to make important decisions 
regarding ballistic missile defense. This new requirement for missile defense could signal 
the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that was designed to codify the 
doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) by limiting Supetpower emphasis on 
the development of ballistic missile defense systems. 
The Persian Gulf War provides both military and political lessons concerning the 
use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. While haq 
2 W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response (New York: Praeger, 
1990), 5. 
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never acquired nuclear weapons, their relative success with its WMD programs shows that 
the problem is of real concern and requires immediate attention if we are to have any 
success in preventing or slowing the spread of these weapons. The Iraq case, however, 
should be viewed only as an example to gain a better understanding into the problem and 
of the limitations of the current nonproliferation regime because the threat from ballistic 
missiles today far surpasses that of Iraq's missile programs during the Gulf War. 
The dramatic Iraqi missile attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia in 1991 gave 
the issue unprecedented urgency. However, it was not long before public interest shifted 
to other issues such as the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the civil war in 
Yugoslavia. Most defense analysts agree that unless drastic changes are made to stem the 
increase in missile programs, it is only a matter of time before the problem gains too 
much momentum for the United States to control 
B. MElHODOWGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The general question that this thesis addresses is how the United States can, by 
force, political will, or international cooperation, stem the global proliferation of ballistic 
missiles. Specifically, this thesis assesses the performance of the missile nonproliferation 
regime in dealing with Iraq's development of ballistic missile programs. 3 The case of Iraq 
illustrates that the pre-1992 missile nonproliferation efforts failed to control the spread of 
3 This thesis defmes the missile nonproliferation regime primarily as the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR). In addition to the MTCR, the regime includes unilateral initiatives, international 
export controls and the ability of the MTCR signatories to enforce these policies. 
3 
missile technology and that changes in the regime since 1992, although more effective, 
are still insufficient to prevent future proliferation. The lessons learned from Iraq's efforts 
to acquire ballistic missile technology are used to evaluate the performance of the regime 
during this period. This thesis then examines the efforts of the United States and the 
United Nations to eliminate Iraq's missile capability. illuminating the performance of the 
MTCR will ultimately enable the regime to make further changes to accomplish its stated 
goals. 
This thesis consideres three elements of Iraq's missile program: 
1. The acquisition of complete missile systems or key components of missiles; 
2. The acquisition of missile technology in the form of education or technical 
know-how; 
3. The acquisition of missile production equipment enabling the Iraqis to 
develop and produce its own missiles. 
This thesis utilizes the 'case study' method. It provides the reader with an in-depth 
knowledge of Iraq's missile proliferation history as well as the history, intentions and 
objectives of the MTCR. The thesis then compares the intended objectives of the MTCR 
to the missile capabilities that Iraq was able to acquire in order to assess the performance 
of the regime. 
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C. CASE SELECTION 
Iraq is the focus of this study because it has been through the entire spectrum of 
arms control efforts of the nonproliferation regime. It has been on the receiving end of 
counterproliferation efforts, as was shown by the Israeli attack on the nuclear reactor at 
Osiraq. The West has also used many diplomatic strategies to deter Iraqi WMD and 
missile proliferation, including coercive diplomacy, deterrence with the threat of force, 
UN sanctions, preventative war, intrusive international inspections, and a thorough 
monitoring regime. In sum, Iraq has been the object of both peaceful and forceful means 
of dissuasion. Nevertheless, the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles continue. 
Iraq also serves as a good case for analysis because it is surrounded by so many 
potential enemies. Iran, Syria, Israel and Turkey are all publicly hostile towards Iraq and 
all have shown ambitions for WMD acquisition. 4 Both Iraq and its neighbors could 
seemingly justify the need for WMD for security reasons, however, it is internationally 
agreed by developed states that the existence of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, 
as well as an advanced means of delivery by Arab nations, would prove destabilizing for 
the region and must be avoided at all costs. 
D. THESIS STRUCfURE 
Chapter I outlines the case selection, methodology and structure of the thesis. 
Chapter II analyzes the global problem of ballistic missile proliferation. It pays 
4 Proliferation Threat and Response. 
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particular attention to the relationship between ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction and how both categories of weapons are of particular concern in the Middle 
East. This chapter sheds light on several fundamental questions that surround the issue 
of ballistic missile proliferation. Specifically, does the proliferation of missiles really 
matter, and if so, is it possible to prevent? Chapter II also examines the missile 
nonproliferation regime. Centered mainly around the MTCR., this chapter discusses 
international and unilateral efforts to control the spread of ballistic missiles and missile 
technology. This chapter lays out the objectives and intentions of the regime and 
evaluates the performance of the regime in the case of Iraq. 
Chapter III analyzes Iraqi motivations for ballistic missile acquisition and 
development. This chapter examines the military and security threats that Iraq faces, and 
the role that ballistic missiles play in the Iraqi military infrastructure, and the level of 
prestige that these systems bring to the Hussein regime. It examines the regional and 
domestic situation within Iraq to ascertain the rationale for building such an extensive 
missile program and attempts to determine why, after being defeated in war, Iraq still 
attempts to retain its missile program by hiding equipment and deceiving UN inspectors. 
illtimately, examining Iraq1s history al~ows us to better understand the motivations 
that states have for acquiring extensive missile programs in spite of international pressure. 
Having an understanding of a nation1S rationale, the United States can better formulate 
nonproliferation and counterproliferation strategies to slow, prevent or reverse the spread 
of ballistic missiles. 
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Chapter IV discusses exactly how the Iraqis were able to acquire such an advanced 
missile program over such a short period of time. It examines how Iraq was able to 
circumvent international export laws and global arms control agreements to achieve the 
most aggressive and successful missile program in the region, with the exception of Israel. 
It describes a determined and often illicit international procurement network to acquire 
ballistic missiles (as well as all types of weapons of mass destruction) and how this 
network is still in use today and remains a real threat in the future. 
This chapter provides examples that demonstrate the weaknesses and limitations 
of the current missile nonproliferation regime through Iraq's strategies and methods for 
acquiring ballistic missiles and missile technology. This chapter is of particular 
importance because it illustrates both the successes and failures of the regime. 
Chapter V discusses the international efforts to target and destroy Iraq's missile 
capabilities fromduring Operation Desert Storm to the present. This chapter examines 
Coalition efforts to destroy Iraqi missiles and missile storage and production facilities as 
well as the efforts of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to do the same. Although 
future proliferation incidents will be different from the Iraq case, it is useful to 
examine/analyze the efforts of Coalition forces and UNSCOM inspectors because it 
provides direction toward additional international efforts that may be required to prevent 
proliferation. 
Chapter VI examines the current status of Iraq's ballistic missile program to 
ascertain just how successful the nonproliferation efforts have been in eliminating Iraq's 
ballistic missile program. Focusing primarily on the efforts of the UN Special 
7 
Commission after the war, this chapter shows that additions to the nonproliferation regime 
may be necessary to counteract the inherent weaknesses. Chapter VI also assesses Iraq's 
current capabiliti~s to rebuild its missile program when the inevitable occurs and the UN 
sanctions are lifted. 
This chapter is of particular importance because it assesses the ability of the 
nonproliferation regime to reverse the spread of missiles and associated technology. The 
regime was developed, the war was fought and UNSCOM was formed to eliminate Iraq's 
W:MD capabilities. The current status of Iraq's programs, with estimates for the future 
Iraqi capabilities, ultimately measures the performance of the regime. Chapter VII states 
the findings and recommendations. 
E. FINDINGS 
There are 3 major findings: 
1. Prior to 1992, the MTCR failed to complete its stated goals of controlling the 
spread of ballistic missile technology; 
2. The existence of the MTCR, while necessary to slow missile proliferation, is 
not sufficient to prevent proliferation; 
3. For a determined and resourceful p-roliferator additional enforcement is needed 
to counter future proliferation. 
These findings provide four major implications for U.S. policy. First, the lessons 
from the Iraq case can be used to highlight the changes necessary for the MTCR to 
effectively prevent proliferation. Whether in the form of formal changes in the structure 
8 
of the agreement or in additions necessary to augment the regime in the event of another 
determined proliferator, it appears that the MTCR requires many changes in order to 
successfully meets its stated goals. 
Second, this thesis helps chart future policy related to Iraq. Specifically, Iraq's 
past, present and potential future WMD capabilities will provide a guide for the United 
Nations in assessing how the international community will deal with Iraq. The future of 
UNSCOM inspections and the future of the UN sanctions are just two of the many policy 
decisions that must be made regarding Iraq. 
Third, insights from the Iraq case provide a roadmap for dealing with other 
potential proliferators, such as Iran, Libya and North Korea. The United States has also 
learned, and continues to learn, much about Iraq's covert procurement network and closing 
this network will result in slowing the supply of ballistic missiles and missile technology. 
Lastly, this thesis illustrates the imperfections and unreliability of the missile 
nonproliferation regime and the continuing real threat to the United States. It also shows 
that the United States needs to continue to pursue programs for ballistic missile defense 
for both the continental United States as well as deployable systems for our military 
personnel overseas. These findings confirm the need for a capable military 
counterproliferation option to be used as a another tool for preventing proliferation. 
9 
10 
n BALLISTIC 1\fiSSILE PROLIFERATION 
This chapter exammes the problem of ballistic missile proliferation and its 
relationship to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. It also exammes the 
international efforts to stem missile proliferation. 
A. BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION 
The United States has achieved a great deal of military success in the post-Cold 
War era. Our forces are more capable and better equipped than those of any potential 
adversary. Although many analysts are quick to point out our inability to fight two major 
regional contingencies simultaneously, in the immediate future there does not seem to be 
a threat to our interests from a nation that we can not handle militarily.~ However, a 
small WMD capability, especially in the hands of the wrong country, can change this 
situation overnight. WMD and missile proliferation are major global security issues. 
Fortunately, because of the range and characteristics of the delivery systems, the threat 
remains regional and, for the meantime, does not affect the continental United States. 
These threats, however, have serious and immediate implications for our allies as well as 
U.S. military forces overseas. 
~The ability for the U.S. military to fight two major contingencies simultaneously has been hotly 
debated as the post-Cold War military draw-down continues. 
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1. .. Characteristics of Ballistic Missiles 
Ballistic missiles are unmanned, guided weapons/delivery systems having one or 
more rocket stages that typically provide propulsion over a small portion of a flight path. 
During most of their flight path, missile warheads traverse a free-flight ballistic trajectory 
which, for longer range missiles, is partially or totally above the atmosphere. Flight times 
to targets range from a few minutes for short-range tactical systems to about thirty 
minutes for ICBMs. 6 Ballistic missiles can deliver either conventional or unconventional 
warheads. 
Part of the military value attributed to ballistic missiles stems from a commonly 
held view that their is no defense against them. The performance of the U.S. Patriot 
missile defense system could alter this perception, but the true value of the Patriot system 
against a serious missile attack has not yet been proven. 
2. Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Ballistic missiles with ranges over a few hundred kilometers have proven to be 
exceptionally inefficient when compared to other weapon systems. 7 Armed with 
conventional warheads, ballistic missiles have never been decisive in any conflict where 
they have been employed. 8 This has long been recognized by the nuclear powers, which 
6 John R. Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military 
Effectiveness," International Security, 17, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 43. 
7 Ibid., 47. 
8 The Iran-Iraq War and the second Gulf War displayed the tactical and strategic utility of ballistic 
missiles in a major confrontation and there is disagreement regarding the decisiveness of missile use during 
these conflicts. For a full description of the use of missiles see: Martin S. Navias, Going Ballistic: The 
Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East (London: Brassey's, 1993). 
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rely on ballistic missiles for the delivery of their nuclear warheads. This inefficiency has 
also been realized by new missile states, since it is widely believed that most intend to 
use ballistic missiles as a delivery system for nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.
9 
Since the end of World War II, the major powers have acted to contain the spread 
of nuclear weapons. For the most part, their efforts have been successful and have 
limited nuclear capabilities to a few nations. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
has been the cornerstone of this effort. Recently, however, the debate on controlling the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles has evolved from initial concerns about their role as 
delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons to broader concerns about missiles as carriers of 
other types of unconventional weapons. As John Harvey states, "the issue of concern is 
not ballistic missile proliferation itself but the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, 
including delivery vehicles of sufficient range, by irresponsible states." 10 Therefore, a 
study of ballistic missile proliferation must include the delivery of conventional, chemical 
and biological warheads as well as nuclear warheads. 
B. DOES BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION MATTER? 
An important challenge to the rising concern over ballistic missile proliferation is 
the gravity of the problem. There is an argument that if ballistic missiles do not introduce 
9 Trends indicate that most nations pursuing CBW also pursue ballistic missile programs. See: 
Proliferation Threat and Response, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April, 1996). 
10 John Harvey, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control (Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, 1991), 167. 
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new or greater capabilities--if they do not increase a state's ability to inflict death and 
destruction--it is of no great consequence whether or not new countries are trying to 
acquire them. Using this argument, instead of focusing on militarily trivial ballistic 
missiles, greater attention should be devoted to the control of other weapons with greater 
military capability. 11 
From this perspective one of the greatest dangers of missile proliferation is over-
reaction. The risk of over-emphasizing ballistic missiles is said to have two 
consequences. First, this emphasis on the problem of ballistic missile proliferation can 
overshadow or draw attention away from other more dangerous weapon systems like 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Second, it could lead to unnecessary hampering 
of the defense industry in the form of military missile technology as well as having a 
negative effect on other areas of the civilian industry, such as civilian space programs. 
Skeptics argue that in most circumstances manned aircraft are a more effective 
delivery system than ballistic missiles, carrying greater payloads and delivering with 
greater accuracy. 12 Regional ballistic missile forces tend to be too small and too 
inaccurate to seriously threaten neighboring countries. They also argue that ballistic 
missiles alone have little destructive power~ and that it is the proliferation of NBC 
warheads that should receive a majority of nonproliferation efforts. In contrast, it must 
11 This argument surfaces when discussing the use of landmines or hand-grenades which kill or 
wound far more people than balllistic missiles. It is especially prominent when discussing the transfer of 
manned aircraft and cruise missile technology. 
12 For a complete description of the benefits of manned aircraft vs. ballistic missiles, see: W. Seth 
Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response, (New York: Praeger, 1991), 40. 
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be noted that ballistic missile programs typically cause far greater instability than any 
other weapons system, including advanced aircraft. 13 This instability derives from two 
features: 
1. These missiles can easily be modified to carry chemical or biological 
weapons; 
2. Ballistic missiles have the ability to penetrate an enemy's airspace, including 
that of the United States. 
The pace of missile proliferation in the 1980s leaves little doubt that many 
regional powers feel that these weapons are worth their price and, perhaps, that merely 
possessing a missile research program provides a level of status and a similar deterrent 
' 
value to a successful missile program. This argument demonstrates that ballistic missiles 
are rarely, if ever, decisive on their own, but that they can have effects that are 
disproportionate to their actual destructiveness. Even small numbers of ballistic missiles 
can be highly significant politically. The inability to target or defend against an enemy 
equipped with ballistic missiles assures their military significance and a nation equipped 
with ballistic missiles enjoys the luxury of assured penetration. Responding to a question 
about the use of German V-2 rockets during WW II, then Chief of the Royal Air Force, 
R.V. Jones stated that the reason for their effect lies in basic human fears: 
The answer is simple: no weapon yet produced has a comparable romantic 
appeal. Here is a 13 ton missile which traces out a flaming ascent to 
heights hitherto beyond the reach of man, and hurls itself 200 miles across 
13 Ibid., 44. 
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the stratosphere at unparalleled speed to desend on a defenseless target. 
One of the greatest realizations of human power is the ability to destroy 
at a distance, and the N azeus [sic] would call down his thunderbolts on all 
who displease him. 14 
Critics who insist that conventionally armed missiles are merely psychological 
weapons can be dismissed by sensible military planners that they miss the point that much 
of warfare is psychological, too. As Aaron Karp states, "the essence of warfare is not 
measured purely in terms of destruction but in the ability to use force and threats of force 
to achieve political goals. Weapons that intimidate or panic an adversary have a military 
significance that is different from, but not necessarily any less than, that of weapons more 
efficient in killing and destroying." 1s 
C. CAN BAUJSTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION BE PREVENTED? 
Classical realists argue that advances in military technology are virtually 
unstoppable. They feel that the proliferation of advanced weaponry is so far beyond reach 
that policy making has no chance to halt its progress. Similar arguments suggest that 
military technologies evolve from their internal logic that, once proven effective by the 
larger powers, will not stop until all states possess the weapon or until it is replaced or 
proven ineffective. This idea of a 'blind force' compelling governments to pursue military 
14 Kagan, "haq Case," 186. 
15 Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, 49. 
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technology is discussed in Aaron Karp's study on missile proliferation.
16 Termed "self-
sustaining technological momentum", "the technological imperative", or "technological 
creep", it implies that once a military infrastructure becomes necessary for the success or 
survival of a given nation, it is extremely difficult and often impossible to stop the 
diffusion of weapons technology. 
Historically, weapons proliferation is not as deterministic. One must only look at 
the advent of nuclear weapons to ascertain that the widespread proliferation of new 
technology is far from inevitable. In fact, it is a goal of this thesis to show that large 
states, given a certain level of conviction and resolve, ought to be able to stop smaller 
states from acquiring new technologies felt to be inappropriate. 
With the rise of dozens of missile programs in the 1980s, it is impossible to ignore 
that these nations see some political and military utility in ballistic missiles. The 
problem, however, is much more complicated. Like nuclear weapons, the production of 
ballistic missiles is extremely complicated and often unsuccessful. Although they 
seemingly appeared out of nowhere, the ballistic missile programs of the 1980s were 
started perhaps ten or twenty years earlier. Although many programs continue, many 
others have not . produced successful missjle programs while others have proven 
successful, however, due to international pressure they have been terminated. Therefore, 
the inevitability of widespread development of ballistic missiles could be exaggerated. 
16 Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 8-15. 
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D. THE MISSILE NONPROLJFERATION REGIME 
Four multilateral arrangements control the transfer of dual-use military technology. 
They are ( 1) the W asenar Arrangement, formerly the Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls ( COCOM), for restrictions on a wide range of items that 
affect military capabilities; (2) the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or London Suppliers 
Group that restrict the transfer of nuclear items; (3) the Australia Group for chemical and 
biological items; and ( 4) the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for missile 
systems, technology and production equipment. 
The goal of this section is to describe the international efforts for the control of 
ballistic missiles. Although this thesis shows that additions to the regime are necessary, 
it also demonstrates that the regime has experienced a great deal of success and is usually 
capable of slowing, if not stopping, the spread of missile technology. 
1. The Missile Technology Control Regime 
The MTCR is an informal non-treaty association of states having a common 
interest in limiting the spread of ballistic missiles and missile technology. According to 
the guidelines, the original purpose of the MTCR was to "reduce the risk of nuclear 
proliferation by placing controls on equipment and technology transfers which contribute 
to the development of unmanned nuclear delivery systems." 17 Over time, that goal was 
expanded to limit the risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by 
17 Deborah A. Ozga, "A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime," The 
Nonproliferation Review, 2, no. 3, (Winter 1994): 66-93. 
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controlling the transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems for such 
weapons. 
The regime's guidelines break exports into two categories. Category I regulates 
the exports of complete missile systems and unmanned air-vehicle systems capable of 
delivering a 500 kilogram payload to a range greater than 300 kilometers. Category I also 
regulates the export of complete subsystems such as rocket stages, motors, guidance 
components and production equipment. Items listed under Category I stand little chance 
of being granted a license to be exported (with the exception of missile production 
equipment which is totally prohibited). Transfer is only permitted if the receiving nation 
assures, through diplomatic dialogue, that the items are being used for legitimate or non-
military purposes and that they will not be modified, reproduced or retransferred. 
Items listed in Category II are missile parts and equipment that are dual-use in 
nature. These items are propulsion components, propellants, structural composites and 
materials, flight and navigation equipment, ground support equipment or the equipment 
to design or build production facilities. Although Category II items are less tightly 
controlled than Category I items, the receiving nation must guarantee that the end-use of 
the transfers will not be associated with its WMD programs. The country's past arms 
control history, particularly in the field of WMD, is strongly considered before permission 
for the export is granted. 
There are three historical landmarks that show the need for control of ballistic 
missile technology. First is the pervasive role of Western assistance in the missile 
programs in the Third World. The most notable example of this was Western European 
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assistance in the Argentinean CONDOR II program. This proved significant because it 
showed the limitations of the regime to punish known MTCR violators. Second was the 
introduction of China as a missile exporter. China's sale of CSS-2 missiles to Saudi 
Arabia in 1987 showed the severity of the proliferation problem. Third was the use of 
SCUD missiles during the Iran-Iraq War, most importantly, the impact that these missiles 
had on the civilian population. 
a. History 
The origins of the MTCR date back to the 1970s when the United States 
became aware of the dangers posed by missile programs of developing nations. Just as 
India's nuclear test in 1974 was the monumental event that alerted the developed world 
of the problem of nuclear proliferation, so too was India's 1980 test of a space launched 
rocket (SL V) an alert to the problem of missile proliferation by developing nations. Early 
concerns for ballistic missile proliferation were first brought to international attention 
during the 1976 Geneva Convention where the problem of the proliferation oflong-range 
systems was first introduced. It was during this time that the developed world saw the 
destabilizing nature of advanced missile systems and that they needed immediate controls. 
A U.S. interagency task force began to look at the problem of missile 
proliferation in 1981. In 1982 secret talks were initiated with U.S. allies. Although 
primarily a U.S. initiative, the original MTCR was negotiated by the 'G-Seven' 
industrialized nations: the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Canada, France, Italy 
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and Japan. No additional nations joined the regime before 1990, but by 1992, 22 
countries had become members. Today 28 nations are members. 
Early Soviet attitude towards the MTCR was understandably negative. 
The Soviet Union opposed the regime for three main reasons. First the negotiations for 
the regime were conducted in secret and the Soviets refused to adhere to an agreement 
that they did not participate in drafting. Second, the Soviets felt that the MTCR was 
another attempt at a COCOM-type treaty. They felt that COCOM, and now the MTCR, 
'-
was an attempt by the West to confine and restrict the Soviet economy. The Soviet 
Union had exported thousands of missiles during the 1980s and the MTCR would only 
serve to limit these sales. Third, the Soviets felt threatened by the 1987 Israeli test of the 
JERICHO II missile and the inherent limitations brought on by the MTCR would only 
serve to make the threat more pronounced. 
b. Strengths and Weaknesses 
The MTCR generally has proven to be a successful instrument for slowing 
the spread of ballistic missile technology. Examples of the regime's successes can be seen 
in the dismantling of Argentina's CONDOR II program and the cancellation of several 
Brazilian systems throughout the 1980s and- early 1990s. The reluclant adherence by 
China, once a target of the MTCR, provide an example of the influence of the regime and 
its members. Although not without flaws, the regime continues to bring light to the 
problem of missile proliferation and sends a signal to potential proliferators that their 
programs are not going unnoticed. 
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The MTCR does, however, have a significant number of shortcomings that 
continue to impede its ultimate success.18 These weaknesses include: 
• Although membership has grown dramatically over the past five years, the 
regime suffers because of limited membership. ·The regime is doomed to fail 
if non-MTCR signatories reap the benefits of not adhering to the guidelines. 
• As a supplier's regime, it is inherently discriminatory. This type of policy is 
said to cause greater friction between developed and developing nations and 
could ultimately lead to greater instability. 
• As a supplier's regime, the MTCR ignores the demand for ballistic missiles. 
Although the MTCR is currently looking at regional issues, opponents to the 
regime state that addressing the supply of missiles examines only half of the 
problem. 
• The MTCR was designed to prevent the spread of long range-missiles to 
countries that possessed a nuclear weapons capability. The regime was not 
originally intended to prevent the spread of missile technology to developing 
nations. 
• The regime lacks any kind of verification mechanisms to enforce the 
guidelines. 
• Although a Sanctions Law 1s now m place, it has only recently been 
exercised. 19 
• Opponents state that without the threat of punishment for violations, the regime 
will never be strong enough to enforce. 
• The guidelines for the regime are C1.!fiently interpreted by each nation. The fact 
that some countries interpret the regime more liberally than others will lead to 
disagreements among members as to the exact meaning of the agreement. 
18 For a description of the strengths and weaknesses of the MTCR, see Brad Roberts, Weapons 
Proliferation in the 1990s, (London: MIT Press, 1995), 121. 
19 The Sanctions Law has recently been used against South Africa, Russia, India, Pakistan, Syria, 
China, Iran and North Korea. 
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• The regime was drafted and ratified without including the most guilty of 
missile exporters. As a regime to prevent the spread of missiles, the MTCR 
must address the nations that are exporting a majority of the systems. Russia 
is now joined by China and North Korea as the main missile exporters, 
however, they were not part of the drafting of the MTCR.
20 
China, the Soviet Union and the United States had scheduled bilateral talks on 
missile proliferation, but these talks were cancelled after the events at Tianammen Square 
in JlDle of 1989.21 Subsequent talks with China and Russia led both states to agree to 
adhere to the regime's guidelines. However, both have been accused of MTCR violations. 
China was accused of violations in 1993 and in subsequent years with the suspected sale 
of M-11 missiles to Pakistan,22 and Russia has been accused of export violations with 
suspected shipments to Iran and Iraq. 
2. Unilateral Export Controls 
Most Western COWl tries have Wlilateral controls, with varymg degrees of 
effectiveness, on exports of missile systems and technologies. These national controls 
supplement the multilateral arrangements. For the United States, the Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976 (AECA) and the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) serve as the 
principal domestic legislation for the control of missile technology. 
2
° China agreed to adhere to the regime in 1994 and Russia became a member in 1995. North 
Korea is the only country that continues to overtly export complete systems. 
21 
"U.S. Fears that China Again May Sell Missiles," New York Times, 11 November 1989, p. 
A14. 
22 Zachary S. Davis, "China's Non-Proliferation and Export Policies," Strategic Digest, November 
1995, 1681, and Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 6, June 1995. 
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a. Arms Export Control Act 
The AECA authorizes the Department of State to regulate all defense-related 
exports from U.S. Government sources as well as civilian defense contractors. The 
AECA also authorizes the State Department to compile and manage a list of defense items 
that cannot be exported called the U.S. Munitions List. Sections of this list which 
regulate the transfer of missile technology include Category IV (Launch Vehicles, Guided 
Missiles, Ballistic Missiles and Rockets), Category Vill (Aircraft and Spacecraft), 
Category XI (Military and Space Electronics), and Category XVll (Technical Data).23 
b. Export Administration Act 
The EAA gives the Commerce Department jurisdiction not only over weapons, 
but also over all items or technologies that could make a significant contribution to the 
military potential of any country. Even if the exporter meets the licensing requirements 
of the Commerce Department, the President or State Department may still prohibit the 
export for reasons ofNational Security. Some nations, such as France and Germany, have 
considerably more lenient export control laws than that of the United States. While most 
items under the MTCR also fall under U.S. export control laws, not all items under the 
MTCR fall under other countries export control laws. 
3. Bilateral Export Controls 
Since 1988, Russia and the United States have engaged in bilateral talks about 
missile proliferation. During the September 1989 meeting between Secretary of State, 
23 John R. Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles," 118. 
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James Baker, and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the two countries discussed 
limiting missile proliferation through an international mechanism such as the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA ), however, the MTCR is a well-defined agreement that has 
enjoyed a substantial amount of international support and will remain the primary 
agreement for the control of missile technology. Russia had agreed to uphold the MTCR 
agreement while falling short of completely adhering to the regime untill995 when they 
became a member. 
E. CONCLUSION 
As the United States and its allies constantly review and revise their export control 
policies to address the proliferation policies of the post-Cold War era, we must examine 
existing agreements to determine the best solution for a complicated problem. At the 
same time, the United States cannot rely solely on supply-side strategies. Export 
controls, for example, are only likely to delay the acquisition of critical dual-use 
technology by a state determined to acquire them. Until the United States and our allies 
address the demand for weapons of mass destruction as well as pressures to supply those 
demands, nonproliferation efforts will be incomplete. 
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m IRAQI MOTIVATIONS FOR ACQUIRING BALliSTIC MISSILES 
Over the past two decades, Iraq's foreign policy, military and weapons acquisition 
strategies seem to be driven by the personal ambitions of Saddam Hussein. Since the 
Gulf War, Saddam has pursued three closely related objectives: 
1. To assure his own survival and the survival of the regune from both 
international and domestic threats; 
2. To restore Iraq's sovereignty and independence while reducing foreign 
interference in its internal affairs; 
3. To rebuild the country's armed forces and restore its military capabilities. 
This third objective is necessary for achievement of the first two and it is the motivation 
for this objective, with particular emphasis on ballistic missile capabilities, the focus of 
this chapter?4 
Iraq's motivation for a ballistic missile program can be divided into three main 
categories. However, these categories become interrelated and overlap significantly. The 
emphasis for these motivations has also changed over time as the threats to and ambitions 
of Iraq have changed. Although conclusions are possible, determining which motivations 
had greater influence on Iraqi military decision-making is somewhat speculative. 
Assessing how these weapons fulfill Iraq's strategic and tactical objectives provides 
valuable insight into Iraq's motivations for acquiring ballistic missiles. This could then 
24 Simon Henderson, Instant Empire: Saddam Hussein's Ambition for Iraq, (San Francisco: 
Mercury House, 1991), 52. 
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be compared to haq's declared policy and subsequently compared to haq's actions in order 
to determine if declared defense policy matches the weapons systems currently being 
sought, imported or produced. This analysis should also assess why other weapons 
systems, such as high performance aircraft, have been foregone in favor of ballistic 
missiles. 
The first category of haqi motivations for ballistic missile acquisition are 
Baghdad's percieved security or military threats. Iraq has serious foreign security threats 
and has the right to maintain an army to defend themselves. Domestic security threats 
are also a major rationale for the restoration of the Iraqi military as was shown by the 
recent religious and ethnic struggles that continue to threaten the Hussein regime. 
The second category falls under the concept of the level of political prestige and 
influence that may be derived from possessing a ballistic missile program; in short, it may 
be substantial. In addition to being able to deter potential enemies, ballisitic missiles 
serve as status symbols. An analysis of haqi emphasis on military prestige and the need 
to prove technical competence makes Iraq a unique case. Although the prestige derived 
from a successful missile program may not be a decisive factor in most ballistic missile 
programs, prestige and proving technical competence has played a significant part in the 
Iraqi missile program. 
Institutional factors that drove the Iraqi ballistic missile program are the third 
category. The emphasis given to Iraq's entire Wl\ID program was astounding and Saddam 
Hussein demanded results quickly; thus one can ascribe a high level of competitiveness 
between key actors belonging to Iraqs military-industrial infrastructure. The arms race 
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within haq, combined with the willingness of foreign suppliers, provoked a certain 
competition within this relatively small nation as success was based on the speed and 
level of production. 
A. MILITARY AND SECURTIY CONCERNS 
In 1974, Iraqi acquisition of SCUD-B missiles from the Soviet Union began. 
Modification of these missiles began in 1987?5 While hatred dominates Iraqi-Persian 
relations, open hostilities between han and Iraq did not begin until the onset of the 
hanian Revolution in 1978-79. This indicates that the threat from han was not the 
primary reason for acquiring ballistic missiles in 1974, but was the major reason for the 
modification of haq's SCUD-B missiles in 1987. The most apparent threat facing haq 
at the time of the initial acquisition was from Israel.26 Assumed to be a nuclear power, 
Israel was, and still is, said to have the most sophisticated ballistic missile program in the 
Middle East. 
The Israeli missile program revolves around two specific missile systems. First 
is the MGM-52 C Lance system that Israel acquired from the United States in early 1975. 
The LANCE has a range of 130 kilometers and a CEP (circular error probable) of 
25 Rachel Schmidt, et al., Global Arms Exports to Iraq, 1960-1990, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1991), 
21. 
26 Efraim Karsh, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 136. 
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approximately 150 meters?7 This missile system posed little regional threat to 
neighboring countries, with the possible exception of Syria, because of its short-range and 
poor accuracy. Even though this missile posed no threat to Iraq, it established that the 
Israelis possessed the most capable weapons system in the region. Second, the more 
secretive JERICHO missile, developed with assistance from the French, is believed to be 
a solid-fueled rocket that has potential payload of 600 kilograms, large enough for ~e 
delivery of nuclear weapons and can be deployed on a TEL (transporter, erector, 
launcher)?8 
Now divided into two separate weapons systems, the JERICHO I and II, with a 
range of 600 and 1600 kilometers respectively, remains the most capable missile system 
in the Middle East.29 Similar to its nuclear weapons program, the Israeli's will neither 
confirm nor deny the existence of the JERICHO missile systems. In 1989, however, the 
U.S. Department of Defense confirmed the existence of the JERICHO missiles, believed 
to be intended 11 as a delivery system for its nuclear, chemical or high explosive 
warheads. 1130 Although the LANCE and the JERICHO make up the core of the Israeli 
missile capability, it was the Israeli emphasis on missiles during 1960's and early 1970's 
27 Duncan Lennox ed., Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems. (United Kingdom: Sentinel House, 
1996), 90. 
28 Ibid., 90. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Norman Kempster, "Pentagon Discloses Israeli Nuclear Missile," Los Angeles Times. November 
5, 1989. 
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that made others in the region, particularly the Iraqis, pursue acquisition of these weapons, 
leading to the Iraqi SCUD-B purchases in 1974. 
The existence of Israel's superior ballistic missiles, combined with their alleged 
nuclear capability posed an obvious threat to Iraq, to say nothing of other factors such as 
religious, or cultural differences the dominate the Arab-Israeli relations. This threat was 
a major factor in Iraq's quest for a nuclear weapon as well as missiles capable of reaching 
' 
Israel. Possessing a weapon that could deter the Israelis became paramount for all Arab 
nations and, since Saddam Hussein was the self-proclaimed leader of the Arab world, the 
task of countering the Israelis fell to him. Saddam himself stated the need to deter Israel 
with missiles when he stressed: 11 A just peace is possible when, if Israel possesses one 
missile, the Arabs possess one missile, so that neither can use it. 1131 
This perceived military imbalance worsened when the Israelis attacked and 
destroyed the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osiraq. Committed to revenge, Iraq continued its 
nuclear weapons program underground and it was not untill991, after the Gulf War, that 
the Western world realized how close the Iraqi's had come to manufacturing a deployable 
nuclear device.32 Coinciding with this capability Iraq also needed a reliable delivery 
system that could threaten Israel, yet still att~ its stated goals of domestic production. 
31 Quoted in Kenneth Timmerman, The Death Lobby: Ho~ the West Armed Iraq, (London: Fourth 
Estate, 1992), 382. 
32 It is logical to assume that, given Iraq's extensive nuclear weapons programs, they would have 
eventually sought a capable ballistic missile for nuclear warheads. While it appears that the initial intent 
of the AL HUSSEIN project was not related to a nuclear weapons delivery system, there is evidence that 
this missile (in modified form) may have been selected for this purpose in later programs. 
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Additionally, the haqis also feared another attack against their NBC or missile facilities. 
Unlike the Israelis, however, Iraq could not support an advanced aircraft program and still 
have any hope of indigenous production. Iraqi aircraft were also unable to penetrate 
Israeli air space due to the superiority of the Israeli Air Force and air defense systems. 
The Iraqis chose to rely on ballistic missiles as a delivery system for their 
conventional and unconventional warheads because they satisfied their three major goals 
for a missile program. 
1. Ballistic missiles gave the Iraqis the ability to penetrate Israeli air space. 
2. They gave Iraq the ability to someday produce missiles indigenously in an 
attempt to become more self-sufficient. 
3. Missiles also allowed the haqis to deploy an offensive weapon that had little 
chance of being used against the regime in the event of a military coup. 
Iraq felt that possession of ballistic missiles would deter Israel from conducting another 
strike against its WMD facilities. 33 
haqi motivations for ballistic missiles then turned to its second largest threat, Iran. 
The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 had tremendous significance for haq, because it 
signaled the end of the 'cold peace' between th_e two countries that had existed since 1975. 
In particular, the fall of the Shah resulted in the end of the Algiers Agreement and the 
resurgence of the Kurdish question.34 In addition, the establishment of a populist Shi'i 
33 Henderson, Instant Empire, 126. 
34 Peter Sluglett, ed. Guide to the Middle East, 92. The Algiers Agreement of 1975 restored the 
boundary between the two countries and issued land to Iraq's Kurdish population. 
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government in Iran was a matter of grave concern to Iraq and set the two nations on a 
collision course. 
Saddam Hussein resurrected the old disagreements over the boundary between the 
two countries in the Shatt al-Arab region and the status of the Southwest Iranian 
providence of Khuzistan/Arabistan. Saddam Hussein used the frequent cross-border 
incidents as a pretense for going to war with Iran on September 22, 1980, leading to the 
largest exchange of ballistic missiles during a 52-day period of the war termed the 'war 
of the cities'. As opposed to their deterrent effect on the Israeli's, Iraq's missiles were 
meant to be used against Iran. Indeed the AL HUSSEIN range modification program was 
the direct result of Iranian missile attacks on Baghdad. Iraq needed to respond and strike 
Tehran. The AL HUSSEIN was the was the weapon system designed to accomplish this 
objective. In December 1989, then Foreign Minister, Tariq Azziz said that: 
Iraq is still threatened by Iran ... consequently we will do our best to acquire 
the necessary defense equipment required to defend our country in case the 
other side contemplates the resumption of hostilities. 35 
Locked in an all out war, Iran began using SCUDs against Iraqi cities in 1985.36 
The effect of these missiles on the Iraqi population, especially during the 'war of the 
cities', was tremendous. Seth Carns maintained that: 
35 Navias, Going Ballistic, 50. 
36 Karsh, Saddam Hussein, 154. 
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Missiles fired at Baghdad and Teheran ... caused tremendous damage 
seemingly out of proportion to the size of their warhead. In some cases, 
entire streets of shops and houses were destroyed. In other instances 
reinforced concrete skyscrapers were devastated by missile strikes. 
Typically, the missiles left craters at least 10 meters across and several 
meters deep.37 
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran launched at least 117 SCUD-Bs while Iraq launched over 
300, (mainly the AL HUSSEIN versions) 160 of which were fired during the 'war of the 
cities'. 38 The use of these missiles also supplemented the seriously depleted ground forces 
and air power of both sides. After the war Iraq claimed victory and credited the AL 
HUSSEIN missile for 'bringing the Iranians to their knees'. 39 The military and political 
effect of these missiles was realized by all nations, particularly the Middle East, and 
played heavily into Iraq's continued rationale for a ballistic missile program. 
The second Gulf War did little to alter Iraqi motivation for ballistic missiles. 
Fortunately, the Iraqi SCUD attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia were militarily ineffective. 
However, SSMs proved to be the only weapon system to have an appreciable effect on 
coalition forces. The increasing availability of missile technology combined with the 
potential use with unconventional warheads has drawn international attention even more 
sharply to the use of missiles as a delivery sys!em. Although other platforms have proven 
more capable, accurate and possess longer ranges, the ease with which missiles and 
37 Carus, Ballistic Missiles, 31. 
38 Ibid., 32. 
39 Most would agree that the use of chemical weapons had an equally large, if not greater, effect 
on Iran. 
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missile technology were acquired, used, maintained and concealed have made them 
increasingly attractive to smaller powers like Iraq. 
Domestically, the Iraqis have learned that many weapons, particularly combat 
aircraft, are a potential coup weapon, whereas ballistic missiles are not. As an oppressed 
nation of divided ethnic and religious groups presently suffering under an oppressive 
regime, the chances of the government being overthrown by a military coup is always a 
possibility. As opposed to other weapon systems, ballistic missiles would probably not 
be utilized in the event of a military or popular coup.40 
B. PRESTIGE AND LEGITIMACY FACTORS 
The second category of motivation for Iraqi acquisition of ballistic missiles is for 
the prestige and legitimization that these weapons bring to the governments that deploy 
them. The Iraqi quest for legitimization can be thought of at three different levels: 
1. In global terms, it can be understood as the Iraqi need for advanced weapon 
systems to gain prestige as a legitimate military power as well as to deter 
Western intervention into Middle Eastern affairs. 
2. In a regional sense, Saddam Hussein required these weapons to appear strong 
to other Arab nations and to dete~ potential regional adversaries. 
3. Domestically, these weapons legitimized Saddam Hussein as a competent 
leader; a leader not just of Iraq but of the entire Arab world.41 
40 Sluglett ed. Guide to the Middle East , 92. 
41 Henderson, Instant Empire, 94. 
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As Iraqi Culture and Information Minister, Latif Nusayyif, stated in December 1989: 
Our acqw.s1t10n of these formidably sophisticated technological and 
military capabilities is not meant for aggression ... we have acquired these 
[missile] capabilities to safeguard the dignity of this nation and preserve 
its image as a nation cherishing tolerance, generosity and human 
interaction. 42 
Nusayyifs emphasis on 'these formidable and sophisticated technological and military 
capabilities' indicates that the prestige of ownership was undoubtedly a substantial 
motivation for the Iraqi acquisition of ballistic missiles. 
While the Israelis and other missile-producing nations have gone to great lengths 
to keep their missile programs in complete secrecy, Iraq has never disguised its intentions 
or abilities to acquire, modify, produce and use ballistic missiles. At the 1989 Iraqi Arms 
Fair, missiles were proudly paraded in front of the Iraqi people as well as the international 
public and, although specific information pertaining to these missiles, such as source of 
technology, site locations and order of battle were not publicly announced, the missile 
capabilities and potential for use was information that was widely publicized. 
For the Iraqis, and others in the Middle East, the ability to master the complexities 
of guidance technologies, rocket fuels, metallurgy and other aspects of ballistic missiles, 
is a reflection of a state's technical sophistication and competence.43 In Baghdad's eyes, 
missiles served the purpose of a 'technological demonstrator' or symbol of domestic 
42 Kagan, Iraq Case, 188. 
43 Navias, Going Ballistic, 48. 
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technological competence. An example of this was when Iraq fired its first space rock,et 
launcher in 1989, Baghdad Radio reported: "By this the Iraqis prove yet again that 
possession of science and knowledge is not exclusive to certain countries and [a matter] 
on which they can have a monopoly."44 
Although most experts in Middle Eastern affairs would agree that prestige 
considerations were secondary to that of legitimate Iraqi security concerns, they were 
important because Saddam Hussein believed that missiles would help to reinforce his 
standing with the Iraqi people, his Arab neighbors and the entire world. For Saddam, 
who clearly saw himself as the leader of the Arab world, such status symbols were not 
only important, they were a necessary part to retaining his power. As Aaron Karp has 
stated: "Even if particular missiles do not change a country's military capability, their 
symbolic power may alter the perception of national leaders within the deploying country 
and among it adversaries. 4~ 
C. INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC FACfORS 
In most nations, the success of a particular weapons program is primarily due to 
the efforts of a small group of individuals, perhaps even one person. This person could 
be a political, military or scientific leader who convinces the nation's leadership that a 
particular program is necessary or at least requires more emphasis. An example of such 
44 Kagan, Iraq Case, 190. 
45Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," International Affairs 9, no.3 (Winter 
1984/85): 168. 
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an occurance was the efforts of Lieutenant General Erich Heinemann who was known as 
the father of the German V rockets. Heinemann, who was also the one who convinced 
Adolf Hitler to place more emphasis on missile research instead of other projects, was the 
single greatest factor for the success of Germany's V rocket program. Dr. A.P.J. Kalam 
is another example. Dr. Kalam played a major role in the development of India's missile 
program as director of the Defense Research and Development Organization. Perhaps the 
best example is the relatively small group of American and British scientists and 
engineers who controlled the early stages of the research for the first atomic bomb -the 
Manhattan Project. 
The theory behind institutional factors to a missile program is effectively captured 
by Donald MacKenzie in his book entitled, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology 
of Nuclear Missile Guidance.46 In this book, MacKenzie introduces how institutional 
factors spurred the ballistic missile guidance programs of the United States. These 
political and organizational factors involve competition between organizations, in the form 
of inter-service or inter-agency rivalries, or individuals, in the form of engineers and 
scientists that manage these programs. In Iraq's case, all of their missile programs 
competed for resources. Run by a relatively s~all number of engineers, logic dictates that 
getting them all to work on one project would lead to greater success. 
Similar to the above examples, Iraq's missile efforts consisted of a small group c;>f 
individuals who controlled the purchase, deployment, modification and reverse 
46 Donald McKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance, 
(London: MIT Press, 1990), 20. 
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engineering of their missiles.47 Although the specific personnel who initiated and 
controlled Iraq's ballistic missile projects are classified within U.S. intelligence reports and 
UNSCOM inspection documents, it is logical to assume that the competition between this 
relatively small group of individuals was a substantial portion of the drive for Iraq's 
ballistic missile research.48 Therefore, the motivations for the acquisition of ballistic 
missiles fell upon a select group of individuals: Iraq's missile experts. As was the case 
with anyone who operated under the Hussein regime, results were the priority and, aided 
by the availability of missiles and related technology, Iraqi desire for ballistic missiles 
increased. 
The Iraqis also employed many different projects and information gathered about 
these programs implies that these projects had little interaction with each other and led 
UNSCOM inspectors to feel that these programs lacked strategic coordination and were 
possibly overwhelmed by the massive numbers of weapons being imported.49 
Economic motives were also a factor for Iraqi emphasis on production of ballistic 
missiles. Although Iraq never exported any missiles, doing so, especially to other Arab 
nations, in the future would undoubtedly be in Iraq's financial interest. In 1989, the Iraqi 
Minister of Industry and Military Industriali."?ation, Husayn Kamil Hassan, stated that: 
47 Henderson, Instant Empire, 158. 
48 The specific individuals that make up Iraq's ballistic missile experts is classified and beyond the 
scope of this study. These individuals, as well as Iraq's entire covert procurement network, continues to 
be investigated by the United Nations today and is not necessary to understand the point of Iraq's 
institutional motivations for ballistic missiles. 
49 Derived from interviews with UNSCOM inspectors. 
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"Iraq was studying requests from a number of states to purchase Iraqi weapons" and that 
"weapons will be given to Arab states or to friendly states that support the Arabs. "50 
Although not specifically stating the exporting of ballistic missiles and understanding that 
public statements are not definitive of future Iraqi actions, doing so would appear to 
satisfy three key objectives for the Iraqis. 
1. It would allow them to generate some revenue to lower the cost of their own 
missile program. If revenue was not a motive for missile sales it could be 
assumed that the Iraqi•s would trade Iraqi-made missiles for other WMD 
technology. 51 
2. Selling (or perhaps even giving) Iraqi-made missiles, particularly to other 
Arab nations, would give Saddam Hussein increased prestige among his 
fellow Arab leaders. 
3. Exporting Iraqi missiles would cause considerable international concern, 
particularly to the United States. Saddam Hussein could use this to his 
political advantage. 
Another econormc consideration when examining the motivations for ballistic 
missile production would be to examine the cost and benefits of alternative weapons. As 
discussed earlier, Iraqi aircraft would be much better suited to deliver the necessary 
ordnance to the enemy. Iraqi Su-24 aircraft have twice the range as AL HUSSEIN 
missiles and can deliver over 17,000 pounds of explosives compared to 400 pounds on 
the AL HUSSEIN. However, there are four key reasons why ballistic missiles are a better 
50 Mark H. Kagan, "Iraq's Case: The International Trade and Proliferation." in William C. Potter 
and Harlan C. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), 185. 
51 Henderson, Instant Empire, 158. 
40 
alternative than increasing development of an Iraqi Air Force. First, the cost of the 
infrastructure necessary for a capable Air Force dwarfs that of a ballistic missile program. 
Second, the Iraqi's knew that they have a better chance of producing relatively 
unsophisticated missiles as opposed to aircraft. Third, as mentioned earlier, the regime 
in Baghdad knows that aircraft are a potential coup weapon. Lastly, ballistic missiles give 
Iraq some level of assured penetration into enemy airspace, whereas, with the superior 
capabilities of the Israeli Air Force and Israeli air defense systems, would preclude Iraqi 
air superiority.52 
In addition to domestic production and the possible sale of ballistic missiles, Iraq 
showed substantial interest in the production a space launched vehicle (SL V). At first 
glance it would appear that Iraq's desire for a SL V would be for the eventual production 
of a Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). Based on UN inspections, the speculation 
is that the Iraqi's desired the capability to launch satellites with real time intelligence 
capabilities. Iraq lacked this capability during both Gulf Wars. This arguement is more 
believable when one looks at Israel's open desire for a satellite capability for intelligence 
purposes. 53 
52 Navias, Going Ballistic, 49. 
53 Peter de Selding, "Israel Follows Slow Path Towards Early Warning Satellites" Defense News, 
17 October, 1994. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Iraq has powerful incentives to acquire ballistic missiles. They are prestige 
weapons that demonstrate the technological sophistication of the countries that own them. 
More important than possessing them, however, Iraq's desire was to produce them 
indigenously. Such capabilities are a confirmation of modernity and a symbol of self-
reliance. It would be a mistake, however, to say that missiles are only acquired for 
prestige. Ballistic missiles satisfy both military and political requirements as well. 
Missiles with WMD warheads serve as a formidable deterrent because of the fact that 
missile defense capabilities are far behind the capabilities of the missile systems. Given 
these strategic and tactical uses for ballistic missiles it is easy to see why Iraq and many 
other Third World nations desire missiles over equally capable weapon systems. 
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IV. IRAQ'S MISSJLE PROGRAM: 1970-1990 
In September 1981, Iraq invaded Iran, starting what was to become the seven-year 
Iran-Iraq War. At the outset of this war, Iraq was barely able to operate and maintain 
their mostly Soviet-made military equipment. By 1990, however, when Iraq invaded 
Kuwait, they possessed a military-industrial infrastructure whose size and technological 
sophistication rivaled those in many Western countries. Iraq•s NBC and ballistic missile 
programs received particular attention during this time and undoubtedly saw the greatest 
transformation. By 1988 Iraq had the most ambitious WMD and ballistic missile program 
in the Third World, with the exception of China. Exactly how this relatively quick 
transformation took place in the face of seemingly effective and competent export controls 
and arms control treaties is the focus of this chapter. 
Iraq•s ballistic missile program involved four strategies. 5
4 First was the purchase 
of complete missile systems. This process centered around importing the SCUD-B missile 
systems from Russia. While the missile program revolved around the SCUD-B, Iraq also 
imported many other missile systems, including SAMs, ASMs and AAMs. These other 
systems allowed Iraq to gain valuable know~edge on all aspects of missile technology. 
Aside from purchasing complete systems, the Iraqis also purchased large amounts of 
missile production equipment striving for their ultimate goal of indigenous production. 
54 Information derived from interviews with UNSCOM inspectors or from the semi-annual 
UNSCOM reports from UNSCOM to the UN Security Council. The latest report used in this paper is date
d 
11 October 1996. 
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haq•s second strategy was the modification, particularly range extension, of these 
missiles. haqi engineers had great success modifying the Soviet-made SCUD missile and 
they were able to more than double the range. The third Iraqi strategy was an attempt 
to reverse engineer SCUD missiles, striving for an indigenous production capability. 
More than 80 SCUD missile engines were produced by Iraqi engineers and attempts at 
other advanced equipment also proved successful. 55 The final strategy for haq•s ballistic 
missile program was eventual indigenous production. In 1989, haq let it be known that 
it possessed a missile that could reach Europe and into parts of Russia. This threat 
worsened when the Western world learned that this missile was completely assembled, 
tested and deployed by Iraqi engineers. 
A. IRAQI IMPORTS: BACKGROUND 
haq emerged in the 1990•s as the world•s leading arms importer of the past decade 
with over $63 billion (1990 dollars) in total purchases from 1980-1988.56 Most of this 
value was supplied by the former Soviet Union, but Iraq•s ability to pay for its large 
purchases with hard currency or through oil barter agreements made it an attractive target 
ss Allan George, "Iraq Reveals Capability to Maunfacture SCUD Engine," Flight International, 
September 20, 1995, 19. 
56 Rachel Schmidt, et al., Global Arms Exports to Iraq, 1960-1990, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1991), 
43. 
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for other .countries as welL France, China, Brazil, Poland, West Germany, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia and Italy were among its suppliers. 57 
Iraqi imports during this period followed three major trends. First, during the 
1960s, Iraqi imports increased dramatically; however, they were still somewhat selective 
towards the systems being purchased. Iraqi emphasis was still on weapons for its massive 
army, such as tanks, armored vehicles and personnel carriers, artillery pieces and small 
arms. 
During the 1970s, Iraq increased its purchasing and pursued a policy of 
diversifying th~ countries from which it bought its weapons in an attempt to reduce the 
leverage that its suppliers could exert over it. Iraq imports now needed to include 
'offsets', such as a level of training from the exporting nation as well as agreements for 
spare parts. It was during the mid-1970s that the Iraqis began importing SCUD-B missile 
systems. 
During the 1980s Iraqi imports made the most dramatic change. Changes in 
Soviet policy in the mid-1970s and again in the 1980s made suppliers appear less reliable 
than Iraq would have liked. While Iraqi weapons acquisition philosophy continued with 
the purchase of complete systems, parts, training etc., it expanded to included the 
purchase of the production equipment itself. This change in philosophy was particularly 
evident in the purchase of ballistic missile production equipment from many European 
57 Total arms shipments to haq over the period of 1980-1988 averaged about $7 billion annually 
(1990 dollars). The enormous deliveries to haq helped make the Middle East the largest arms-importing 
market throughout the 1980s, and haq was consistently the largest importing country in both the region 
and the world. See: Schmidt, Global Arms, 12, 43). 
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nations.58 After Saddam Hussein's rise to power in 1978, Iraq saw dramatic increases in 
total imports as well as increases in the numbers of missiles and missile production 
equipment being purchased. Although this policy may have created a logistic nightmare 
for the Iraqi military infrastructure, it gave Iraq access to highly advanced military 
technologies in all areas of the defense industry. At times, these suppliers often competed 
against each other for a share of the Iraqi market. The end result was that Iraq obtained 
large quantities of state-of-the art weapons from a variety of suppliers. 
Although a primary goal of the regime in Baghdad was to establish an indigenous 
ballistic missile program, at this point, the Iraqis were primarily missile importers and 
modifiers. Had the Gulf War not taken place most experts would agree that Iraq would 
have had an advanced domestic missile program as well as a successful nuclear weapons 
capability.59 The increasing pressure to support international agreements, such as the 
MTCR, combined with the decrease of weapons supplied by the former Soviet Union, 
forced Iraq to become less dependant on others for their weapon systems. Establishing 
an indigenous ballistic missile program became not only a desire but a requirement for 
Iraq to reach its stated goals. 
58 For a complete list of companies named for providing direct assistance to Iraq's ballistic missile 
facilities, see: Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (London: Brassy's, 
1991), 43. 
59 Mike Eisenstadt, "The Sword of the Arabs: Iraq's Strategic Weapons" Washington Institute 
Policy Paper no. 21 (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress), 40. Eisenstadt also discusses Iraq's extensive 
biological and chemical weapons programs. 
46 
B. IRAQI STRATEGIES FOR ACQUJRING BALLISTIC MISSILES 
Similar to its nuclear weapons program, haq's ballistic missile program followed 
the philosophy of redundancy to ensure both success and security. Their goal was to 
build a competent, capable and indigenous missile production program by exploiting the 
competitive nature of the world export market and the increasing availability of ballistic 
missile technology. The Iraqi strategy for acquiring and developing a ballistic missile 
program consisted of four major elements. They are: 
1. The purchase of missiles and missile technology; 
2. The modification of haq's missiles; 
3. Reverse engineering; 
4. Domestic production. 
1. Purchase of Missiles and Technology 
Iraq has purchased hundreds of ballistic missiles since the mid 1970s and 
thousands of other missile systems.60 As shown in Chapter ill, the haqi's had great 
demand for this sophisticated weaponry; however, they would not have been nearly as 
successful if it had not been for the willingness of foreign governments and companies 
to fulfill haq's needs. 
60 Sources put the total number of Iraqi missiles at 6,000 at the start of the second Gulf War. This 
included AAM, SAM, AShM, SSM and ASM. 
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a. Purchase of Complete Missile Systems 
The first and probably most successful method for Iraqi acquisition of 
ballistic missiles was to purchase them from foreign governments. Iraq in the 1970s was 
an oil rich nation that had the cash to pay for these large purchases. 61 The most important 
nations involved in such a relationship with Iraq were the Soviet Union, and Brazil. 62 
Unlike more sensitive items that required covert transfers, the Iraqis found that transfers 
of ballistic missile systems could be done, in effect, openly. There are three primary 
reasons for this lack of interest. First, these early missile transfers were conducted before 
the inception of the MTCR and, although not popular, were 'legal' and not a violation of 
any established intremational export guidelines. Second, the West feared that an Iraqi 
loss to Iran would cause great instability in the region and possibly upset the flow of 
Persian Gulf oil. Because of this theW est often overlooked large Iraqi missile purchases. 
Lastly, these transactions took place during the height of the Cold War where the transfer 
of a relatively short-range ballistic missile system to a Third W odd nation that lacked a 
nuclear weapons capability was not seen as a serious threat. 
A critical part of Iraq's missile program was their purchase of short-range 
artillery rockets. Although not categorized as ballistic missiles, these artillery rockets 
have proven to be the basis of the modem Iraqi missile program and continue to be an 
61 The availability of almost unlimited fmancing was also crucial to the success of the Iraqi 
acquisition program. Covert operations, which were liberally used to obtain more problematic items, are 
by defmition more expensive. Iraq often paid two or three times the value of the equipment because of 
its sensitivity. 
62 Timmerman, Death Lobby, 147. 
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important part of their program today. Originally purchased from Brazil in the late 1970s, 
the ASTROS 2 rocket had a maximum range of 68 kilometers. The Iraqis almost 
immediately copied this rocket and were able to produce the ABABIL 50 and 100, with 
a range of 50 and 100 kilometers, respectively.63 Working with artillery rockets gave the 
Iraqi's a cheap experimental rocket with which to gain the valuable knowledge needed for 
the production of longer range systems. The ABABIL 50 and 100 proved useful as a 
tactical weapon when used to support the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1981. 
The next major missile system obtained by Iraq was the Soviet made 
FROG-7 missile. Between 1970 and 1988 the Soviets supplied Iraq with several hundred 
FROG-7 missiles. Just like the ASTROS 2 rocket, the Iraqi's soon produced an improved 
version of the FROG-7 called the LAITH 90. At 9.1 meters in length, a weight of 2300 
kilograms and a range of 90 kilometers, the LAITH 90 was used by Iraq to begin 
experimenting with different warheads like cluster bombs, fuel-air explosives and 
chemical agents. 64 
In 1974, Iraq began purchasing SCUD-B missiles from the former Soviet 
Union. Although, the total number of SCUDs purchased by the Iraqi's is not known, best 
estimates put the number at around 800.65 A relatively short-range system with limited 
accuracy, the SCUD-B was to become the backbone of the Iraqi ballistic missile program. 
63 Carus, Ballistic Missiles 41. 
64 Martin S. Navias, Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East, (London: 
Brassey's 1993), 22. 
65 UNSCOM missile inspectors put the total number at 819. 
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As Iraq continued to purchase short-range missiles, their desire for a longer 
range system increased. In 1986, Baghdad reportedly sought to purchase the more 
advanced Soviet-made SS-12 missiles, which had a range of 560 miles. The Soviets 
feared exporting missiles with long-range, especially to an unstable nation like Iraq, which 
had shown the ability and desire to modify the missile and increase the range. Therefore, 
the request was denied and more Scud-Bs were delivered in their place. By 1988, the 
Iraqi's had purchased over 800 SCUD-B missiles from the Soviet Union. The SCUD-B 
missile became the workhorse of the Iraqi missile program and, once modified, became 
an important, if not decisive factor in the Iran-Iraq War. The modified SCUD-Bs also 
played a significant role during the second Gulf War. 
In addition to the hundreds of surface to surface missiles purchased during 
this time, Iraq also purchased thousands of surface-to-air and surface-to-ship missiles from 
the Soviet Union. Similar to the modifications of the FROG-7 and the ASTROS 2 SSMs, 
Iraq quickly worked to redesign these missiles into SSMs. 
b. Acquisition of Missile Technology 
Exactly how Iraq acquired missiles and technology took many forms. At 
the overt level, Iraq purchased hundreds of n:llssiles from the Soviet Union, however, the 
education and training of Iraqi engineers and scientists in other countries has proven to 
be as important as the transfer of the systems themselves. 
At the covert level, this strategy involved the sales of missiles or related 
parts and technology that "public disclosure would prove embarrassing or dangerous for 
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both nations and possibly lead to international reprisals such as sanctions. "6
6 Here, the 
nations most notably involved were firms from Eastern Europe (particularly Germany), 
the United States and Latin America. 67 These covert transfers are thought to be more 
likely in the future with the increasing pressure of international export controls and the 
MTCR. The likelihood of these covert transfers will probably expand to new developers 
and exporters of ballistic missiles, such as North Korea, or from nations who practice a 
policy of selective enforcement of the MTCR such as Russia and China. 68 
During the 1980s Iraq set up an enormous world-wide procurement network 
to obtain these weapons as well as spare parts and other equipment. In addition to missile 
technology, this network was created to obtain nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) 
weapons technology. One important example involving this network was Iraq's front 
companies set up in Great Britain. The two most important front companies purchased 
by Iraq were the Technology and Development Group (TDG) and Meed International. 
TDG was set up by Dr. Safa al-Habubi, an Iraqi engineer and former head of the Nasr 
State Establishment for Mechanical Industries. TDG's most important action was the 
purchase of the British machine and tool company, Matrix Churchill. Ownership of these 
companies enabled haq to obtain the necessary technology for its WMD programs that 
66 Mark H. Kagan, "Iraq's Case: The International Trade and Proliferation," in William C. Potter 
and Harlan C. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), 187. 
67 Timmerman, Death Lobby, 148. Germany being the largest contributor. 
68 The most recent example of this are the reports that China is assisting Pakistan in building a 





it otherwise would not have had access to. It was determined in 1992 that the British 
government became fully aware of the ongoing Iraqi procurement network and that they 
allowed it to continue for three reasons. The first was purely economic. The British 
Trade Department did not want to lose Matrix Churchill's share of the Iraqi arms market. 
Secondly, the British counterintelligence agency was using Matrix Churchill as a means 
of acquiring intelligence on Iraq's global procurement network as well as intelligence on 
haq's entire weapons programs. Third, although two Matrix Churchill employees did go 
to jail, the British government wanted to avoid the embarrassment associated with 
uncovering the entire network. Meed International was set up by an Iraqi national, Anis 
Mansur, and a British national, Roy Ricks, and was instrumental in enabling the Iraqi's 
to import ballistic missile production equipment. 69 
Quite often, however, the Iraqis found that they did not have to resort to 
these methods as the international community, including the U.S., often looked the other 
way or even aided is such transfers. For example, between 1985 and 1988, the U.S. 
Bureau for Export Administration in the Department of Commerce, approved hundreds 
of export licenses for shipments of dual use and military equipment to Iraq, with a 
significant percentage going to Sa'ad 16 for_ their ballistic missile program. "In May 
1985, an American firm sought to export electronic equipment, including 18 Ghz 
electronic counters and six 275 Ghz oscilloscopes. In December 1985, the U.S. based 
Wilton Company sought to export 10 MHZ-40 Ghz scalar network analyzer system. In 
69 See "Iraqi Arms Purchasing: A Network in Europe Revealed," Middle East Markets, 18 
September 1989, or Alan George, "Iraq's London Procurement Fronts," Defense, December 1989. 
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June 1987;.anotherU.S. company soughtto export 19.9 Mbit computer system for process 
control and data evaluation. All of the above items are used in the design or production 
of American missiles and were approved for sale to haq without condition."
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haq also spent lavishly on consulting fees, salaries and benefits for the 
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of foreign engineers, scientists, technicians and workers 
whom they recruited for their military industrial complex. The MTCR, as an agreement 
that attempts to control the supply of missiles and related technology, does not adequately 
address the spread of information or the "proliferation" of trained personnel. Many of the 
Iraqi scientists and engineers were trained in the top universities in Western Europe, the 
United States and the former Soviet Union. "In an interview on 60 Minutes in November 
1991, David Kay, then with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said that 
some "world class physics" had been conducted in haq in their WMD and ballistic missile 
programs. "71 
Today, it is believed by most that only a handful of haq•s ballistic missiles, 
launchers and missile production equipment remain. 72 There is little that the international 
community can do to limit the pool of highly trained personnel that came so close to 
making Iraq a nuclear power with an advanc~d ballistic missile, biological and chemical 
7° Kagan, "Iraq Case" 189-190. 
71 Ibid. 
72 UNSCOM estimate. 
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warfare programs. It is this technical expertise and operational experience that Iraq still 
possesses. 
This covert procurement network combined with Western nations turning 
their backs, allowed Iraq to obtain some of the most technologically advanced weaponry 
in the world. Although lcmger range missiles were withheld from Iraq, the missiles that 
were supplied, combined with the training received by ·Iraqi scientists and engineers, 
enabled their missile program to become extremely advanced in a relatively short time. 
This aggressive missile program combined with an equally aggressive NBC program 
added to the increasing instability in an already volatile region. 
c. Construction of Missile Production Facilities 
Iraq transitioned from missile purchasers to missile producers in only ten 
years. Iraq's change in emphasis from complete missile systems to missile production 
equipment was a significant change and ultimately alerted the developed world to the 
problem of ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World. In Iraq, ballistic missile 
production originally fell under the authority of the State Organization for Technical 
Industries (SOTI), which was run by Husayn Kamil Hassan, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law. 
Kamil Hassan expanded the size and functions of the SOTI, which soon combined with 
the Ministries of Industry and the Military Production Establishment to form the Ministry 
for Industry and Military Industrialization.73 Subordinate to this was the Technical 
Corporation for Special Projects (TECO), which played an important role in missile 
73 Timmerman, Death Lobby, 290. 
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production. Kamil Hassan remained in overall charge as Saddam Hussein kept missile 
production close to the family, thereby indicating the importance he attached to it. 
The Austrian and German engineering company Consultco was primarily 
responsible for the construction of the massive ballistic missile production facility called 
Sa' ad 16.74 Located just outside the Iraqi city of Mosul and covering over 40,000 square 
meters, Sa'ad 16 was the center for Iraq's research, design, modification, testing and 
production for most of Iraq's missile inventory. Sa' ad was also where Iraq tested the use 
of chemical and biological warheads for their ballistic missiles. 
7
s The facility reportedly 
cost the Iraqi's $200 million and construction was completed in 1989.
76 
Other ballistic missile production facilities were located at Falluja (Project 
073 ), a rocket production facility at Mahmudiya (Project 096), and a missile test area near 
Karbala (Project 1157). 
2. Modification of Existing Missiles 
Although the Iraqis were able to produce domestic versions of short-range rockets 
such as the ABABIL 50 and 100, as well as the LAITH 90, the Soviet SCUD missiles 
became the building blocks for the Iraqi ballistic missile program. During the 1980s, due 
to strategic requirements of the war, Baghdad began a rigorous effort to modify their 
74 Consultco is part of a large group of European companies based in Switzerland. Better known 
as the Consen Group, this group of defense related companies served as the prime contractor to all of Iraq's 
defense needs. 
75 See: "Sa'ad 16: Iraq's Military 'Business Park'," Middle East Markets, 15 May 1989. 
76 Mike Eisenstadt, Sword of the Arabs: Iraq's strategic Weapons, 22. 
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SCUD missiles in order to be able to engage targets within Iran, particularly Tehran. 
Iraq's modified missiles experienced limited success until 1987, when the first modified 
SCUDs were used. After 1987, however, these missiles proved successful against Iran 
and alerted the rest of the world to the problem of ballistic missile proliferation. 
a. AL HUSSEIN 
Iraq's AL HUSSEIN missile is a modified Soviet-made SCUD-B missile. 
First reported in mid-1987, the AL HUSSEIN, or Project 144, is believed to be capable 
of carrying conventional or chemical warheads. The greater range of the AL HUSSEIN 
was apparently achieved by reducing the size of the warhead from 800 to 190-500 
kilograms and increasing the fuel capacity by over 20 percent. 77 The AL HUSSEIN 
appears to use modified SCUD guidance technology as the missile is said to have a CEP 
of 500 meters, half that of the unmodified SCUD-B.78 During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq 
fired over 300 modified SCUDs, most of which were believed to be AL HUSSEIN's.79 
It is reported that Iraq fired between 80 and 90 AL HUSSEIN's during the second Gulf 
77 James E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institute, 1991), 55. 
78CEP is defmed as the circular error probable. If a missile has a CEP of 1 kilometer then the 
probability is that one-half of the missiles fired at a target will land inside a circle centered at the intended 
impact point and having a radius of 1 kilometer. The exact range and accuracy of the modified SCUDs 
is highly debated and can vary from missile to missile. 
79 Carus, Ballistic Missiles 37. 
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War. Of these, at least 43 were frred at Saudi Arabia, and a minimum of 38 were fired 
at Israel.80 
b. ALABBAS 
The AL ABBAS appears to be an improved version of the AL HUSSEIN, 
having a longer range than the AL HUSSEIN, but the same payload. The increased range 
was apparently gained by increasing the capacity of the existing AL HUSSEIN propellant 
tanks. Range estimates are between 800 and 950 kilometers. haq claims that the AL 
ABBAS has a CEP of 500 meters, however, U.S. missile experts feel that this is probably 
exaggerated. 81 Although the first flight tests of the AL ABBAS were reported in 1988, 
it is 1mderstood that no AL ABBAS missiles were fired during the second Gulf War. 
c. AL FAHAD 
Another project which the Iraqis 1mdertook was the modification of surface-
to-air missiles to short-range surface-to-surface missiles. These first came to the attention 
of Western observers at the 1989 Baghdad International Exhibition of Military Production. 
The AL FAHAD is a modified SA-2, able to be fired as a surface-to-surface missile. 
d. ALABID 
On December 14, 1989, the Iraqi's reported the test of a satellite la1mcher 
missile. Baghdad reported that the AL ABID consisted of three stages, weighed 48 tons, 
80 Jane's, Strategic Weapons 1996, 27. 
81 Jane's lists the CEP for the AL HUSSEIN missile at 2000-3000 kilometers. 
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was liquid fueled ar · was 25 meters long. 82 Although public statements claimed that Iraq 
desired to put recon.:1aissance satellites into orbit, most Western analysts felt that their 
objective was to merely show the ability to launch such a missile or perhaps to 
experiment with intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The AL ABID consisted of a first 
stage of 5 AL HUSSEIN missile and a second stage consisting of five Soviet-made SA-2 
SAMs. The second stage later proved to be inoperative. The start of the Gulf War in 
1991 cut this project short and its termination remains a primary goal of UNSCOM. 
e. TAMMOUZI 
The TAMMOUZ projects could be called Iraq's most threatening project 
and the one with the most potential. Meant as a signal to Israel and Iran, the 
TAMMOUZ missile had a possible range of 2000 kilometers and with most Iranian and 
Israeli targets within 1000 kilometers, the TAMMOUZ could also have been meant to also 
threaten targets beyond the Middle East. Some analysts speculate that this missile was 
meant to hit Iranian naval bases at Bandar Abbas. As a SSM, this missile could reach 
Moscow, Paris and even London, and would have been of great concern to all nations in 
Europe. Because the TAMMUZ is simply a AL HUSSEIN first stage and a SA-2 second 
stage, the United Nations has destroyed all declared AL HUSSEINS and has tagged all 
declared SA-2's 
82 Jane's, Strategic Weapons, 1996, 27. 
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f. ALmJARA 
Iraq also modified its missile warheads as a means of improving its 
missiles. Some modifications included the use of high explosives, chemical and 
biological weapons and fuel-air explosives. During the second Gulf War, Iraq also fired 
AL HUSSEIN missiles filled with a concrete warhead, called the AL IDJARA, and meant 
11 earth penatrator11 or 11knetic warhead11 in Iraqi parlance. This type of warhead caused 
much greater fragmentation and was able to inflict greater damage on Israeli and Saudi 
Arabian cities. 
g. AL WHALEED 
The Iraqis also developed their own domestic variant of the mobile SCUD-
B launcher known as the AL WHALEED. It is not clear how much this was modified 
from the Soviet TEL (Transporter, Erector and Launcher). It is believed that there are 
still several AL WHALEED's remaining in Iraq. 
3. Reverse Engineering 
The ability to reverse engineer a complicated weapon system, such as a ballistic 
missile, requires an advanced knowledge of engineering and ballistics. By 1991, the 
Iraqis were able to reverse engineer at least 80 SCUD engines. 8
3 This effort, part of 
Project 1728, was disguised as a welding school and was far more successful than most 
missile experts had thought. Although the Iraqi engineers had significantly more trouble 
83 Allan George, "Iraq Reveals Capability to Manufacture SCUD Engine," Flilght International, 
September 20, 1995, 19. 
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with other complex parts, such as turbo pumps and guidance components, they showed 
tremendous potential to reverse engineer many other systems. In addition to SCUD 
engines, the Iraqi's also began a program to reproduce SA-2 engines to be used in 
intermediate range systems. 
4. Domesnc Producnon 
Aided by sizeable infusions of technology from all over Europe, the Iraqis 
succeeded in purchasing thousands of complete missile systems. They also proved 
capable of modifying these missiles to meet certain operational necessities. Although 
successful at reversing engineering, the Iraqi's eventual goal was the domestic production 
of ballistic missiles. 
The first missile domestically produced within Iraq was the ABABIL 50 and 
ABABIL 100, a modified Brazilian made ASTROS 2 artillery rocket. Next was the 
LAITH missile, the Iraqi version of the FROG-7 Soviet-made missile, followed by the AL 
HUSSEIN and the AL ABBAS. Although these are considered indigenously produced, 
they were all Iraqi modifications of imported missiles. 
a. BADR 2000 
The first true domestic project was the BADR 2000. This missile was 
ultimately. designed to be a two-staged missile having a range of 900 kilometers and a 
warhead weight of 500 kilograms. Designed to be a solid fuel missile for the delivery 
of nuclear warheads or fuel air explosives, the BADR 2000, also known as the CONDOR 
II, became the focus of a great deal of international media and global government 
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attention. The complexity and sophistication of the missile required the assistance of 
Argentina and Egypt. 84 This cooperation began in 1984, when Iraq agreed to fmance the 
program, Egypt agreed to secure the technology and engineers from Argentina and Iraq 
would produce the missile. Western pressure, primarily American, slowed the project 
during the late 1980s. This led to the withdrawal of both Argentina and Egypt from the 
project in 1990. Western analysts predicted the end of the project, stating that Iraq did 
not possess the infrastructure to support such a program, however, UN inspections after 
the Gulf War showed that testing of a solid fuel missile, believed to be the BADR 2000, 
had continued throughout the War. This indicates that Iraq intended and attempted to 
continue the program unilaterally. 
C. CONCLUSION 
As Iraq•s global arms imports demonstrate, liberal arms exports policies can have 
unintended consequences. The broad global competition for arms sales enhanced Iraq•s 
military capabilities. U.S. and Coalition forces later faced those capabilities in the Persian 
Gulf War. In the future, arms exporting nations must balance the benefits derived from 
weapons sales against the risk that they might have to fight an importer, such as the 
Hussein regime. 
Iraq•s advances in its missile program, particularly in its ability to reverse engineer 
and domestically produce complicated weapons systems is a global wake-up call: Third 
84 Navias, Going Ballistic, 104. 
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World ballistic missile programs must not be underestimated because doing so would 
ignore the greatest security threat of this decade. 
The Iraqi programs showed the level of success a determined arid resourceful 
proliferator can achieve. Although export control laws were in place, the Iraqis were able 
to acquire any military technology they desired. If not for Saddam's invasion of Kuwait 
and the decisive response of the United States and the rest of the international community, 
· Saddam Hussein probably would be the ruler of a nuclear weapons capable state with the 
missile capability to reach Europe and Asia. 
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V. U.S. AND UN EFFORTS TO COUNTER IRAQ BALLISTIC MISSILE 
PROLIFERATION 
Mobile missile hunting was difficult and costly; we will need to do better. 
Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney 
On January 17, 1991, Iraq responded to Coalition air attacks by launching the first 
of 88 SCUDs from mobile missile launchers. The missile impacts in Israel dramatically 
demonstrated the link between politics and war. A missile labeled 'militarily insignificant' 
by U.S. commanders threatened to undermine the international coalition assembled to 
eject Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait. 
Subsequent to Iraqi missile launches, the coalition commanders were forced to 
divert resources to counter this 'insignificant' threat. This 'SCUD hunt' continued for the 
duration of the war and experienced limited success, at best. After Operation Desert 
Storm, the United Nations formed a Special Commission whose orders were to locate and 
destroy Iraq's ballistic missile and WMD production capability. This chapter assesses the 
efforts required to prevent proliferation and production of ballistic missiles in Iraq. 
Specifically, this chapter addresses the efforts of Coalition forces against Iraq's ballistic · 
missiles and the efforts of UNSCOM in the form of inspections, monitoring and 
destruction of Iraqi facilities. 
63 
A. U.S. EFFORTS TO COUNTER mAQI MISSILE PROLIFERATION 
Unlike the slowly unfolding picture of V-1 and V-2 development that the Allies 
witnessed during World War II, the U.S. and Coalition commanders knew that Iraq had, 
and was willing to use, ballistic missiles. Iraq had already demonstrated the ability to use 
missiles in combat and had also showed a willingness to use chemical weapons. 85 
Observation from the Iran-Iraq War provided a useful but limited amount of information 
about Iraq's missile capabilities. Coalition intelligence planners had two major problems: 
1. The number of missiles and launchers that Iraq possessed and their 
capabilities; and 
2. How Iraq would employ the missiles against the coalition. 86 
Coalition efforts to counter the Iraqi ballistic missile threat consisted of two major 
strategies. First was the use of the Coalition air forces to locate and destroy Iraqi fixed 
missile sites. Although somewhat successful, the air forces could only destroy SCUDs 
from fixed sites after a launch has taken place. Second was the use of Special Operations 
Forces to assist in locating Iraqi mobile launchers and attempt to destroy Iraqi missiles 
before being launched. SOP also experienced limited success. 
85 Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran in 1987, but they use.d aircraft and artillery as delivery 
systems, not ballistic missiles. U.S. military planners assumed that if the Iraqis could not use their aircraft 
due to Coalition air superiority, that ballistic missiles would be the delivery system for these unconventional 
weapons. 
86 Much of the information on coalition efforts against Iraqi missiles is derived from Thomas A. 
Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Summary Report, (Washington, D.C.: Library 
of Congress, 1993) or the long report of the same name, vols. 1-6. 
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1. The Coaliuon Air Campaign 
In the first days of the air campaign, the Coalition attacked all 25 known fixed 
SCUD sites. Twelve were destroyed and the other thirteen were damaged. 
87 The intent 
of the coalition air strikes was to suppress SCUD laliD.ches at Israel, Saudi Arabia and the i 
other Gulf nations. These efforts quickly ran into problems. For example the 
presurveyed mobile laliD.ch sites and hiding places had not been identified before the air 
war started on 17 January 1991.88 Much like the Allied commanders who had ignored 
the V -1 missile sites in World War II, Coalition commanders in the Gulf War similarly 
ignored mobile laliD.chers liD.til they started lallllching their SCUDs on the first night of 
the War. Stopping the SCUDs depended on airpower destroying the known fixed lallllch 
sites, facilities and storage bliD.kers, maintaining a 24-hour SCUD combat air patrol (CAP) 
to find and destroy the mobile laliD.chers, and conducting armed reconnaissance to locate 
and destroy SCUD equipment and facilities. 89 
Approximately 1,500 sorties were flown over 43 days against such SCUD targets 
as mobile missile laliD.chers, suspected hiding places, and the production and storage 
facilities. 9° Fifteen percent of the Coalition air campaign was dedicated to finding and 
destroying SCUD laliD.chers and the overall a,ir campaign took 39 days, nine days longer 
87 Tim Ripley, "Destroying Iraq's Ballistic Missiles," Jane's Intelligence Review 4, no. 10, (October 
1992): 27. 
88 Keaney and Cohen, "Gulf War", 83. 
89 GW APS, vol. 5, 545. 
9
° Keaney and Cohen, "Gulf War," 83-84. 
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than planned. The authors of the Gu1f War Air Power Survey ( GW APS) considered the 
SCUD hunt one of two significant diversions from the planned executions of the air 
campaign.91 Coalition planners had anticipated that Iraq might attack Israel with SCUDs, 
but planned to bomb only the known fixed sites. The most threatening fixed sites were 
near H-2 and H-3 airfields located in Western Iraq and were attacked during the first 
night of the air campaign. The pressure from Washington to destroy the SCUDs was 
tremendous, as President Bush wanted to keep the Israelis out of the war at all costs.92 
To achieve that objective, anti-SCUD operations were a top Coalition priority. 
SCUD hmt tactics essentially required aircraft to orbit over the known general 
area of the mobile SCUD lallllchers, ready to strike when the SCUDs were discovered. 
A variety of aircraft took part in the effort, including Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS), Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS), F-15Es, 
F-16s and A-lOs. Ideally, the Coalition wanted to destroy the mobile SCUDs before they 
lallllched, but decoys, camouflage and clever Iraqi tactics thwarted this aim. Aircrews 
attempted to attack the sites immediately after launch (the crux of the SCUD Hllllt), but 
time, distance and decoys, as well as noise (objects that could be mistaken for SCUDs), 
all worked against this goal. One F -15E crew_ visually witnessed a SCUD lallllch at night, 
and attempted to find the lallllcher, but could not. 93 
91 GW APS, vol. 2, pt.2, 100-101. 
92 GW APS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 184. 
93 Ibid., 187. 
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Iraq successfully fired 88 SCUDs during the war: 38 at Israel, 41 at Saudi Arabia, 
two each at Qatar and Bahrain. Seven broke up in flight. Over 40 percent were launched 
during the fust week of the war.94 The decline lends some credence to Air Force colonel 
John Warden's view that the sorties suppressed SCUD launches in subsequent weeks even 
if they did not destroy any TELs. 
The Iraqis launched the majority of their SCUDs at night. Only three were 
launched during daylight hours, and these occurred in the early daylight hours under 
heavy cloud conditions. 95 Weather also aided the Iraqi SCUD efforts. Heavy cloud cover 
"precluded effective identification of SCUD locations from space and hampered the 
subsequent aerial hunt for SCUD launchers."96 The inability to stop the SCUDs became 
a source of embarrassment to the United States government. 
In the Pentagon daily briefings on the war, Defense Department officials 
constantly stressed that destroying the SCUDs was a top priority. When 
asked why the SCUDs continued to function despite this effort, General 
Kelly admitted, "It's a tough target. The mobile launchers can move and 
hide .. .Iraq is about 170,000 square miles ... Every day we are trying harder 
to get those SCUDs, and sooner or later we're going to get them." 97 
94 W. Seth Carus, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," (New York, Praeger, 1991) 31. 
95 Bermudez, "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm'," 134. 
96 GW APS, vol. 5, 543. 
97 W. Andrew Terrell, "The Gulf War and Ballistic Missile Proliferation," Comparative Strategy 
11, no.2 (April-June 1992):168. 
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Excess airpower, in excess of requirements, allowed General Homer to 'bleed' off 
sorties to hunt for SCUDs. Because of the Coalition's large Air Force, the effect of 
SCUD hunting was mostly to delay attacks on other targets, but it did not alter the 
outcome of the war. Iraq was still forced out of Kuwait. Had Saddam been more 
effective in orchestrating a withdrawal from Kuwait or a cease-fire, the time and sorties 
used to hunt SCUDs might have allowed other targets to have escaped unscathed. 98 
The sorties flown against the fixed launchers failed to suppress the SCUDs 
because the Iraqis used mobile launchers exclusively.99 The fixed sites actually served 
as decoys and destroying them diverted planners attention away from the mobile 
launchers. 100 If the Coalition did not bomb the fixed sites, more SCUDs may have been 
launched. Yet, Coalition planners did not fully understand ballistic missile capabilities. 
Iraq made its missiles, by accident or design, as resistant and elusive to air attack as 
possible. The mobile SCUD decoys were so realistic that they could not be distinguished 
at 25 yards on the ground, much less in the air. 101 
The difficulty in pinpointing the mobile SCUDs made it impossible to confirm the 
destruction of any mobile launchers by Coalition aircraft. Obviously, many decoys and 
look-alikes were hit. Additionally, the maxin;tum number of launches in any day during 
98 Terrill, "The Gulf War," 170. 
99 GW APS, vol. 2, pt. 2, 331. 
100 Ibid., 333. 
101 Ibid., 334. 
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the war never exceeded the number of mobile launchers known to have survived the 
conflict.102 Most, if not all, of the I 00-plus mobile launchers claimed by Coalition 
aircrews and SOF were decoys or other vehicles. 103 
According to Dr. Thomas A. Keaney, staff member of the GW APS team and Chief 
of the Gulf War Air Power Summary Report, the SCUD threat was underestimated. It 
was considered militarily unimportant, but strategically it held the key to holding the 
Coalition together. Keaney asserts that Coalition aircraft probably suppressed the number 
of SCUD firings and degraded their accuracy, however, Iraqi missile attacks continued 
until the end of the war, including 21 hours before the cease-fire when an Iraqi SCUD hit 
an American barracks in Dahran, killing 28 soldiers.104 
2. Special Operations Force Ground Operations 
Most information on U.S. SOF operations against SCUDs is classified. However, 
it is known that U.S. and British SOF units were involved in counter-SCUD operations. 
General Schwarzk:oph mentions that Special Operations teams went deep into Iraq to 
watch the roads and report sightings of mobile launchers.105 There is one mention of U.S. 
SOF involvement in operations against SCUD missiles in the 824-page Department of 
102 Ibid., 330. 
103 GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 189. 
104 AnAL ABBAS long-range missile apparently hit the barracks. "DSP's Detect Fatal SCUD 
Attack," Aviation Week and Space Technology 140, no. 14 (4 April1994): 32. 
105 Schwarzkopf, 1992, 418. 
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Defense Report on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. It states that a key element in 
the counter-SCUD effort was small SOF elements on the ground who provided vital 
information about SCUDs. 106 Special Operations Forces claimed to have destroyed 11 
mobile ballistic missile launchers; however, the GWAPS (later confirmed by UN 
inspectors) illustrates that this could not have been possible and that most launchers 
destroyed by Special Operations Forces were probably decoys. 
3. ''PA1RIOT" Ballistic Missile Defense Systems 
Attempting to destroy and deter Iraqi ballistic missile use, the United States 
deployed Patriot Missile Batteries to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.107 Few can forget 
the televised images of the destruction of Iraqi SCUDs by Patriot missiles. Although 
designed to defend against aircraft, Patriot batteries proved to have some success against 
SCUDs during the Gulf War. The lack of mass SCUD attacks made it easier for the 
Coalition Patriot missiles to target and destroy them. A large attack might easily have 
overloaded the Patriot system. 
Twenty-one Patriot batteries were deployed to Saudi Arabia to protect airfields, 
oil refineries, command and control centers and the combat divisions in the field. 108 Of 
106 DOD, 1992, 168. 
107 A Patriot battery includes up to eight launchers, each with four MIM-1 04 missiles and support 
equipment, including a phased-array radar, a weapons control computer, an electric power plant and 
communications equipment. 
108 Harry G. Summers, "Persian Gulf War Almanac," (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 
1995), 212. 
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the approximately 600 Patriot missiles deployed, 158 were fired at 47 Iraqi SCUD 
missiles over Saudi Arabia and Israel. Hailed at the time as enormously successful, after 
the war the Patriot system came under intense criticism, 109 much of it motivated by fears 
that the success of the Patriot would promote further investment in the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) program to develop a defense against strategic ballistic missiles. 110 
B. UN EFFORTS TO COUNTER IRAQI MISSll.E PROLIFERATION 
In addition to Coalition efforts against Iraq, the United Nations was also essential 
in the fight against Iraq in three major areas. First, the United Nations played an integral 
part in condemning Iraq for its invasion by immediately placing economic sanctions after 
the invasion in August of 1990. Second, the United Nations was essential in forming the 
Coalition. Third, the UN remains an integral part in preventing the rebuilding of Iraqi 
military capabilities by continuing the sanctions and ingpections despite substantial 
international pressure. 
1. UN Sanctions 
In August 1990, the United Nations Security Council placed comprehensive 
sanctions on Iraq under UN Resolution 661.- Shocked by its brutal invasion of Kuwait, 
the U.S. led initiative was designed to: 
109 For a detailed examination of the value of the Patriot System see: Theodore A. Postol, "Lessons 
of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot," International Security 16, no.3 (Winter 1991/92):119-171. 
110 Summers, "Persian Gulf," 213. 
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I. Devastate the Iraqi economy to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait; 
2. W am Iraq that the world commliDity was united in its efforts to force Iraq to 
withdraw; 
3. W eak:en Iraq's ability to defend itself in the case that allied use of force is 
necessary; 
4. Signal worldwide disapproval immediately while deciding on other actions. 111 
These prewar sanctions led to a vigorous debate in the United States over the 
effect of economic sanctions. Many U.S. policy makers and high ranking military 
officers, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, 
favored the continuation of economic sanctions before using military force. 112 As 1990 
came to a close and Iraq's forces firmly in placed in Kuwait, President Bush, with the 
support of Congress, abandoned the economic sanctions placed on Iraq and proceeded 
with Operation Desert Storm. Congressmen Stephen Solarz wrote: "If six weeks of the 
most intense aerial bombing in history was not sufficient to bring about an liD.conditional 
withdrawal from Kuwait, it is simply not plausible to suggest that six more months of the 
relatively benign application of sanctions would have done so." 113 
The postwar economic sanctions placed on Iraq are far more complicated than 
those in place before the war. Member nations disagreed on the severity of the sanctions 
111 Patrick Clawson, "How has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic Sanctions, 1990-1993," 
McNair Paper no. 22, (Washington, D.C.: INSS, August 1993), 3. 
112 Sam Nunn, "War Should Be a Last Resort," Washington Post, 11 January 1991. 
113 
"Don't Argue with Victory," New York Times, 18 March 1991. 
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and also disagreed on the circumstances necessary for lifting them. The main goals or 
intentions of the postwar sanctions are: 
1. To keep Iraq from rearming; 
2. To ensure full compliance with UN resolutions; 
3. To end Saddam's rule; 
4. To punish Iraq.114 
The most ambitious goal of the sanctions is to keep a tight arms embargo on Iraq 
to prevent rearmament. This is particularly true with regard to Iraq's unconventional 
weapons programs. The sanctions regime has achieved much success, however, Kenneth 
Timmerman has proven that Iraq has been able to rebuild much of its military 
industries.us 
2. United Nations Special Commission to Iraq 
In the aftermath of the Gulf War the UN Security Council sought to ensure that 
a defeated Iraq would never again pose a threat to regional and international security. To 
this end, UN Security Council Resolution 687 mandated the dismantling of Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range of greater than 150 kilometers. 116 
114 Clawson, "How has Saddam," 7. 
115 Kenneth Timmerman, "The Remilitarization of Iraq," TheN onproliferation Review 1, no.2 (Fall 
1993): 32. 
116Jonathan Tucker, "Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment: Lessons 
From the UN Experience in Iraq," Nonproliferation Review 3, no. 3 (Spring-Summer 1996), 1. 
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To implement this program of forced disarmament, the Security Council established the 
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). An especially challenging 
aspect of UNSCOM is that they not only deal with non-nuclear WMD, such as 
internationally banned biological and chemical agents, the IAEA is tasked with nuclear 
inspections and monitoring, UNSCOM must also limit their means of delivery. The tasks 
related to ballistic missiles are complicated by the fact that the ban is not total (only 
missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers are prohibited).117 
UNSCOM has unprecedented rights and privledges to inspect and monitor Iraq's 
military and civilian industry. Both the sanctions and inspections, however, are merely 
short-term solutions to a long-term problem. If UNSCOM's successes are to become an 
example of future arms control efforts, it is important to learn all possible lessons from 
this case. 118 
UNSCOM missile inspections, although ultimately successful, have been plagued 
with trouble and controversy. haqi responses to UN missile inspections have caused 
substantial mistrust between UNSCOM inspection team leaders and haqi counterparts. 
Some haqi tactics to hinder UN missile inspectors are: 
11. 
1. To make incomplete and misleading declarations to inspectors in an attempt 
to lead them away from sensitive sites; 
117 Tim Treven, "Ongoing Monitoring and Verification in Iraq," Arms Control Today, May 1994, 
118 Kathleen Bailey, The UN Inspections in Iraq: Lessons for On-Site Verification, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1995), l. 
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2. To intimidate UN inspectors by confronting them about certain sites; 
3. To gain intelligence about intended missile inspection sites by engaging in 
intensive surveillance operations against inspectors by bugging hotel rooms 
and offices used by UNSCOM, monitoring of UN radio frequencies and even 
infiltrating UNSCOM's Baghdad field organization, 119 
4. Destruction of evidence; and 
5. Impeding inspections by stalling or denying entry to a site.120 
To date, UN missile inspectors have conducted over 40 official missile inspections 
and countless day-to-day inspections by UN personnel that remain in Iraq as part of the 
monitoring regime. A majority of the inspections have been pre-planned, while several 
have been no-notice inspections of suspected sites. Estimates of the number of remaining 
haqi surface-to-surface missiles with a prohibited range of greater than 150 kilometers is 
as low as ten and as high as 85.121 While referring to Iraqi ballistic missiles that are 
unaccounted for, UNSCOM chief Rolf Ekeus stated: "We cannot verify that haq does 
not possess long range missiles or components ... We have information and data which 
contradict that." 122 Iraq has admitted to hiding missiles from inspectors in the past, but 
have stated that all haqi SSMs have been destroyed.123 
119 Exposed after the defection of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel. 
120 Tucker, "Monitoring and Verification," 5-9. 
121 
"haq fails to account for SSMs," Jane's Defense Weekly, 30 October 1996, 3. 
122 
"haq still conceals data on its weapons." Executive News Service, 21 October 1996. 
123 Ibid., 1. 
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3. Observations 
With over five years of "anytime, anywhere" inspections, the West is still 
convinced that haq maintains a portion of its surface-to-surface missiles as well as CBW. 
As shown in the next chapter, this equipment is of little threat. As international support 
for the economic sanctions continues to subside, so too will the ability of UNSCOM to 
conduct its inspections. Unprecedented in nature, the efforts of the United Nations have 
proven to be essential in limiting haq•s ability to rebuild its armed forces. This case has 
also shown that international support and agreement is required for effective inspection 
and monitoring of a defeated nation. As Kathleen Bailey puts it, "Unless the international 
community is as politicized and committed as it is in the case of Iraq, such a culprit may 
escape ramifications even if violations are strongly suspected!1124 
C. CONCLUSION 
The efforts of the United States and the United Nations have been instrumental in 
countering Iraqi missile proliferation. Yet three key lessons need to be learned. First, 
because the United States and the rest of the Western world ignored and at times aided 
or encouraged haqi proliferation and aggression, a preventative war was necessary to 
contain Saddam. Secondly, Coalition planners failed to understand or properly defend 
against Iraq•s ballistic missiles. Third, the efforts of the United Nations and, specifically 
124 Bailey, The UN Inspections, 109. 
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UNSCOM, are necessary, but not sufficient to limit the proliferation of ballistic missiles. 
Learning from these lessons is essential to preventing another haq-like experience. 
77 
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VL IRAQ'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM AFfER 1992 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 prohibits Iraqi possession of 
ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 kilometers and also prohibits haq's possession 
of missile production equipment and related technology capable of being used in such 
missiles. Nevertheless, the United States believes haq has hidden a small number of 
mobile launchers and several dozen SCUD-type missiles produced before Operation 
Desert Storm. 125 Consequently, the international community has formed an elaborate 
inspection and monitoring system to limit future Iraqi proliferation of ballistic missiles. 
The monitoring regime currently in place to limit haqi proliferation involves three 
maJor areas. First is the on-site inspections currently being conducted by the Special 
Commission. Second is the utilization of sensors and cameras to monitor Iraq's WJ\.ID 
programs. Third is the process of tagging sensitive equipment to allow UNSCOM 
inspectors to monitor the location or use in WJ\.ID related projects. 126 
Since 1992, haq's ballistic missile program has revolved around three specific 
areas. First are the systems that Iraq currently employs. These involve three short-range 
systems and the potential modification of seyeral SAMs and cruise missiles. Second is 
the research and development programs of several systems that haq could someday 
125 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1996), 24. 
126 Information on Iraq's current and suspected programs have been derived from interviews with 
UN weapons inspectors. 
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employ, including one major program based on the SA-2 propulsion system. Several 
missiles in this category could exceed the 150 kilometer limit set by the UN. Lastly are 
the missile systems that Iraq could employ given its pre-Gulf War resources. Although 
speculative, this section illustrates potential scenarios that could lead to Iraq's possession 
of intermediate- or long-range ballistic missiles. 
The essential problem that this chapter addresses is that the technology and 
equipment used in the production of missiles with a range of less than 150 kilometers is 
in many cases similar to the equipment used in the development of intermediate- and 
long-range missiles. Examining Iraq's current short-range systems, and systems currently 
being researched, it is feared that Iraq possesses the expertise necessary for longer range 
systems. 
A. IRAQ'S DECLARED MISSILE SYSTEMS 
Iraq's current missile system is defmed as the missiles that are currently in the 
Iraqi inventory and capable of being employed. Revolving mainly around three systems, 
all with a range of 90 kilometers or less, Iraq maintains an impressive inventory of 
missiles. 
First is the LUNA or the Soviet-made FROG-7 missile. Although possessed in 
large quantities, the LUNA is a short-range system (70 kilometers) and has limited 
potential for range extension. UN missile inspectors feel that the Iraqis could perhaps 
extend the range of the LUNA perhaps ten to fifteen percent, at best, and that this missile 
is not a major concern. 
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The second system currently being employed by Iraq is the Brazilian-made 
ASTROS II. Limited in number, the ASTROS II has a range of 60 kilometers and has 
limited potential for range extension. Although monitored by the United Nations, this 
system serves little threat to Iraq's neighbors and, like the LUNA, is not a future concern. 
The third system relevant to this discussion is the Iraqi modification to the 
Russian-made SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles. Although not a SSM, the Iraqi's 
are aware of the ability of the Chinese to convert these systems into SSMs.
127 This was 
displayed in the Iraqi pre-Gulf War programs to modify the SA-2 to a surface-to-surface 
missile. These systems have potential for use as a SSM and for range extension. Like 
the LUNA and FROG-7 missile, the unmodified SA-2 and SA-3 missile poses little threat 
to Iraq's neighbors, however, the potential modification for these systems does create 
cause for concern and this threat is discussed in detail in the next section. 
The final group of missile systems currently being employed by Iraq are the 
inventory of Russian and Chinese made air-to-ground and anti-ship cruise missiles. All 
purchased before the second Gulf War, these systems are all older generation missiles that 
can be used as a SSM, but have little potential for significant range extension. Although 
not a specific proliferation problem, and little _threat to Iraq's neighbors, these missiles do 
provide the Iraqi's some level of military utility. These systems have all been tagged by 
UN inspectors and their location is closely monitored. 
127 OSD, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 24. 
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Iraq's currently deployed missile systems pose little threat to neighboring countries 
and receive systemic, though not critical, UNSCOM attention. The threat of Iraq's 
ballistic missile programs lies in the systems currently being researched and developed. 
Although UNSCOM has conducted many inspections attempting to limit Iraq's missile 
programs, they are unable to halt the systems being researched due to the inherent 
restrictions of UNSCR 687. 
B. SYSTEMS CURRENTLY UNDER RESEARCH AND DEVEWPMENT 
The most serious threat from Iraq's missile programs is from the systems that are 
in the process of being developed. The ability to contain Iraq's future missile capabilities 
lies in the assumption that the UN sanctions and UNSCOM inspections will not go on 
forever. Once the economic sanctions and inspections have been lifted, it is believed that 
Iraq will continue to pursue the systems that are currently being designed by Iraqi 
engmeers. 
The major program currently being researched is a process reviving the ABABIL 
50 and ABABIL 100 program. The ABABIL 50 is an artillery rocket currently being 
produced in limited numbers and serves as an extremely short-range but fairly accurate 
missile. 128 The ABABIL 100, however, is currently making the greatest transformations. 
With a larger airframe, this missile is in the development process with both solid and 
128 CEP of less than 500 meters. 
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liquid propellant versions being considered. 129 The range of the ABABIL 100 runs 
dangerously close to the 150 kilometer limit and has the potential to be extended much 
further. This ability to improve these missiles presents the greatest threat to neighboring 
countries. Based on SA-2 technology, this missile has tremendous potential as was shown 
by other Iraqi missiles that used SA-2 engines. 
The F AHD 300/500 first showed the Iraqi's the capability of the SA-2 as a SSM. 
Next was the CONDOR II program that used SA-2 engines as its second stage. The most 
threatening use of SA-2 technology occurred when the Iraqi's designed an SA-2 engine 
as the third stage of the AL ABID space launch vehicle or as the second stage of the 
2,000 kilometer TAMMOUZ ballistic missile. Although these systems were never 
seriously tested, they clearly illustrate the intended path the Iraqis hoped would bring 
them an intermediate-range ballistic missile. 
The AL ABABIL 100 program is also known as the AL SAMOUD, Arabic for 
"to fight against". For the Iraqis, this program serves as an example of how they can 
fight against the entire international community. The ability to reverse engineer the SA-2 
engine is of great concern to UNSCOM, and the inspecting and monitoring of this R&D 
program consumes much of UNSCOM's tim~ and effort in the missile area. 
129 Ibid., 24. 
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C. PROLIFERATION SCENARIOS 
Continued Iraqi research on more capable missile systems leads to three likely 
proliferation scenarios that could occur after the lifting of the economic sanctions and the 
end of the UNSCOM inspections. 130 These breakout scenarios illustrate the three most 
likely and potentially dangerous situations with regard to Iraq's ballistic missile programs. 
Although speculative in that there is no concrete proof of their validity, these scenarios 
are based on the beliefs or 'gut feelings' of UN inspectors that have conducted inspections 
in Iraq since 1992. 
1. Scenario One: Bidden Missile Systems 
The first scenario deals with the discovery of missile systems that were buried or 
otherwise hidden in Iraq. Discovered as an Iraqi deception tactic, the burying of sensitive 
equipment has been of concern to UN inspectors since the end of the war. 131 This tactic 
includes the concealing of complete missile systems, TELs, production equipment or any 
other technology that could lead to future Iraqi missile production. The sentiment among 
130 In a recent Defense News article, UNSCOM's financial problems could bring the end of the 
monitoring regime far sooner than anyone would have liked. If unable to continue inspections, haq could 
potentially rebuild its CBW programs within 12 months and a nuclear program within 5-8 years, sooner 
with outside assistance. haq could also, almost immediately, rebuild the missiles that the UN believes 
remain hidden. See: Philip Finnegan, "U.N. Woes May Allow Bio-Chem Revival in haq," Defense News, 
11, no. 46 (November 18-24, 1996). 
131 UNSCOM and the IAEA have found several sites where equipment has been intentionally 
hidden by haq. Items found were primarily nuclear and ballistic missile technology. These incidents 
illustrate the haqi desire to conceal its weapons and equipment for future use. 
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UN inspectors is that it would not be difficult for the Iraqis to hide missile equipment 
from the UN because of its size and topography. 
The threat that this type of scenario would bring is that the haqis would have 
access to missiles, like the AL HUSSEIN or AL ABBAS, with a range greater than 300 
kilometers. Perhaps worse than the Iraqi possession of long-range systems is the fear that 
they still possess the necessary manufacturing equipment to design, test or produce other 
systems with even greater capabilities. 
The ultimate concern in this scenario would be the international reaction or 
response. Some interesting questions are raised. Specifically, would the United Nations 
have the confidence or conviction, in the form of international support, to go back and 
disarm Iraq? Could the United Nations peacefully dissuade Iraq to give up its W:MD 
programs? Would the threat of continued economic sanctions dissuade Iraq from pursuing 
I 
these weapons? If not, would the United States risk the almost certain negative 
international criticism to unilaterally disarm Iraq? Unable to be answered until faced with 
the problem, these questions could become central to further Iraqi proliferation. 
2. Scenario Two: Future Iraqi Missile Purchases 
The second potential scenario deals- with a purchase of missile systems or 
technology from another country. Likely sources of missiles could be from Russia, who 
is a member of the MTCR, but continues to be suspected of transfering missile 
components to Iraq, China or one of the former Soviet states, who adhere to the. 
agreement, yet continue to follow a policy of selective enforcement; or North Korea, who 
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agreement, yet continue to follow a policy of selective enforcement; or North Korea, who 
is neither a member nor an adherent, and is currently the nation that poses the most 
serious threat to the regime. Since the Gulf War, it has been suspected that Iraq has been 
attempting to tap into its network of sources of WMD technology. Success in this area 
could prove disastrous for missile nonproliferation. The United Nations has spent a 
tremendous amount of time and resources to uncover this procurement network, however, 
in 1995, Jordanian officials, acting with UN assistance, seized a shipment of missile 
components (approximately 115 Russian gyroscopes and accelerometers) enroute to Iraq. 
These components were used in Russian ICBMs and could be used in Iraqi missiles easily 
exceeding the range of 1,000 kilometers. 132 The shipment originated in Russia, illustrating 
that the trade of missile technology still continues, even with states that are adherents to 
the agreement. 
3. Scenario Three: Increased Iraqi Missile Development 
The third potential scenario involves the continued Iraqi success with SA-2 
technology. It is widely believed among UN missile inspectors that after the economic 
sanctions and UNSCOM inspections have been lifted, that Iraq will attempt to design 
intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles. One possibility for achieving this could 
be by using multiple reverse engineered SA-2 engines. Success with this program could 
yield a missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers. Broken down into two differing 
132 Alan George, "UN Uncovers Secret Iraqi Ballistic Missile Project," Flight International, January 
3-9, 1996, and "UNSCOM Report to the United Nations Security Council," December 1995. 
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proliferation philosophies, the Iraqis could opt to attempt to design a large number of 
SAMOUD type missiles. This verticle proliferation would give the haqis a large number 
of missiles with limited capability. 
Use of SA-2 technology could also take the form of horizontal proliferation, where 
the haqi•s attempt to produce a small number of more capable missiles. Focusing on 
quality instead of quantity, the Iraqis could attempt to build a missile with increased 
payload, improved accuracy or an extended range. There appears to be some evidence, 
uncovered by the UN inspectors, that haq was working on some aspect of this design. 
There are three resulting systems that could be derrived from this evidence. Although 
there is no evidence of detailed plans, haqi drawings have been found outlining a system 
utilizing four reverse-engineered SA-2 engines. Clustering four liquid rocket engines as 
the first stage has proven to be successful in India•s PRITHVI missile, which has a range 
of 150 to 250 kilometers. 
Another system that could be developed using current Iraqi missile technology 
would involve staging two short-range engines together. Utilizing some combination of 
a solid rocket engine, like that found in the AL ABABIL, and a liquid rocket engine, like 
that found in the SAJ\.1M:OUD, either in a_ side-by-side or one on top of the other 
configuration. Staging a missile in this manner has been successful in the AGNI 
intermediate-range missile. The range of the AGNI missile is between 1,500 to 2,500 
kilometers. 
The third sytem that could result from this technology is combining both of the 
above systems to make an intermediate-range SSM. This potential two-stage system 
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would involve a clustered four engine turbo pump first stage and a clustered, single 
engine second stage. Although it appears that work on these projects has stopped due to 
close monitoring by the UN, it is feared that these programs could be revived in the 
future. 
This fear over re-engineering SA-2 technology has led UNSCOM to attempt to tag 
all declared liquid rocket engines in Iraq's air defense SA-2s. By doing this, the UN will 
attempt to track all of the engines to ensure that these engines could not be covertly used 
in a SSM project. Continuation of the monitoring regime with this problem in mind 
provides a good chance that the UN can prevent such a missile from being produced, 
however, discontinuing the inspections and monitoring along with lifting the economic 
sanctions would seemingly give Iraq the • green light' for advanced missile development. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Iraq's current missile capabilities do not pose a substantial threat to any of its 
neighbors. Iraq's technological capabilities to rebuild its missile programs are severely 
lacking, unless they have retained more missile technology, production equipment or 
complete systems than UN assessments believe. Their human capabilities to rebuild its 
missile programs exist although most experts would agree that outside assistance would 
be necessary for Iraq to develop a 1,000 kilometer-plus system. The ballistic missile 
threat from Iraq comes in the form of retained technology that has not been detected by 
UN inspectors or could be obtained in future transactions; resources, in the form of 
revenue from past and future oil sales; and detennination, as was displayed during the 
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1980s in t:he form of weapons procurement (specifically WMD technology) and in the 
1990s, in the form of aggression against its neighbors. Iraqi possession of long-range 




The Iraq proliferation case illustrates many lessons which have already been 
exhaustively studied and others which require further study. This thesis has raised many 
interesting issues, including ideas on WMD proliferation and the ability to deter others 
with these weapons, the future of ballistic missile defense, tactics to defeat ballistic 
missiles, the role of the United Nations in these cases (specifically the UN Security 
Council), and the future role of counterproliferation efforts. The main points raised in this 
thesis are outlined in the following sections. 
A. EXPORT CONTROLS 
According to Kenneth Timmerman, 11 the current system of international export 
controls is in shambles. 11133 Although changes were made in the early 1990s through the 
MTCR, the system is still insufficient to stop a determined proliferator from acquiring 
these weapons. This is in part because little is done to limit the supply of weapons 
technology, and even less is done to reduce the demand for these weapons. 
The MTCR, which is designed to limit the supply of missile technology, will 
remain ineffective until a credible enforcement mechanism is inserted to punish regime 
violators. Perhaps this will be impossible until the missile regime is lifted to the same 
133 Kenneth Timmerman, Death Lobby, 88. 
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status as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Unlikely to happen in the near future, the 
Missile Technology Control Regime will probably continue on its path cf limited success. 
While the supply of technology is addressed by the MTCR, the problem of 
managing export controls will not cease until the problem of demand is adequately 
addressed. In her chapter on missile exports, Kathleen Bailey stated: 11 Supply-side 
strategies will not prevent missile proliferation and, increasingly, they will not even slow 
it. 11 Arms control treaties that limit or ban the production of ballistic missiles, security 
assurances and Confidence-and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) are all ways of 
addressing the demand for missiles and, until these issues are addressed, the demand for 
missiles and Wl\ID will continue to drive supply. 
B. MILITARY ASPECIS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION 
An examination of the arming and disarming of Iraq illustrates many military or 
tactical lessons. The ability to hunt and destroy an adversary's ballistic missiles is 
essential to continued U.S. military superiority, however, the methods of destroying 
missiles is not the central theme of this thesis. The main findings within this area are: 
1. The destruction of a nation's ballistic missile (and WMD) capabilities is a 
short-term solution to a longterm problem. Because of the diffusion of the 
technology, the weakness of the current regime, the willingness of suppliers 
and the dual-use nature of the technology, weapons of mass destruction, even 
among Third World nations, are here to stay. This fact also makes a strong 
case for the United States to have the ability to counter these weapons at any 
level. 
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2. _ The use or threatened use of missiles armed with WMD warheads poses a 
serious threat to the United States. For the time being, NBC weapons will 
serve as the stone that can defeat Goliath. Dealing with nations that possess 
these weapons, especially unstable (or seemingly irrational) Third World 
nations, will continue to pose delicate and potentially dangerous foreign 
policy situations for the United States. 
Although Iraq's SCUDs failed to achieve their objective of drawing Israel into the 
war and destroying the Coalition, Coalition airpower also failed in its attempt to destroy 
the SCUD threat. The problems of finding mobile targets with airpower may prove very 
difficult to overcome. 134 First, the regional weather conditions and open, flat terrain in 
Iraq actually favored the hunters, unlike the continual overcast and rugged terrain, such 
that might be encountered in North Korea. Second, even a small increase in the number 
of launchers would require a exponential increase in airpower to suppress, much less 
destroy. Third, air forces of the future will be smaller, and a higher percentage of sorties 
for SCUD hunting will likely have a debilitating impact on the Air Force unless there is 
a revolutionary breakthrough in our ability to locate TELs. 
C. THEMTCR 
Even though the MTCR has enjoyed increasing popularity in the 1990s, there 
remain major avenues of missile proliferation that are not blocked by the existing regime, 
especially: 
134 Although not the primary focus of this study, the discovery of Iraqi chemical and biological 
ballistic missile warheads by UN inspectors greatly complicate the problem of missile proliferation and 
ballistic missile defense. 
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1. Countries attempting to purchase missiles from suppliers from outside the 
regime; 
2. The vast amount of missile technology already dispersed throughout the Third 
World: 
3. The continued transfer of technology in the form of trained personnel. 
This thesis has addressed several problems with the MTCR that need to be 
corrected before it can be effective in preventing the spread of missile technology. 
1. MTCR Membership 
Although 28 nations are currently members of the regime, the MTCR continues 
to suffer from limited membership. Many of the recent additions to the regime have been 
largely symbolic, in that they do not have major missile or rocket industries. The greatest 
threat with regard to membership are the nations that could transfer complete systems. 
China, North Korea and the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States are the 
most significant threat to the regime and their adherence to the regime's guidelines is 
imperative. 
2. MTCR's Lack of Enforcement 
Lacking formal treaty status, the MTCR continues to lack a legitimate method of 
enforcement. This thesis has displayed how nations interpret the guidelines of the regime 
in ways that suit their own interests. The most glaring example of this are France and 
Germany who reject the need for controls on launch and guidance systems to legitimate 
civilian space programs. This distinction between promoting trade and security interests 
has led member nations to disagree as to how the agreement is to be interpreted. The 
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MTCR ne~ds verification mechanisms to attain the legitimacy required to successfully 
complete its goals. The inability to punish obvious regime violators is only compounded 
when members states fail to agree on its interpretation. 
3. 'fighter Technology Restrictions 
The MTCR was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear cap able missiles, but 
recently has had to adjust to other forms of WMD by reducing warhead size and range. 
Due to the dual-use nature throughout the entire realm ofWMD, there must be continued 
adjustment to the categories of prohibited items. Recent developments have shown that 
large numbers of short-range missiles can be just as destabilizing as intermediate-range 
missiles and the MTCR must have the flexibility to adjust to this and similar trends that 
often occur in the proliferation of missiles. 
D. THE INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION REGIME 
The lessons pertaining to the United Nations involvement in the Iraq case are also 
many. Although only in its fifth year, the amount written on the lessons learned from the 
experiences of the UN Special Commission is tremendous and continues to grow. Iraq 
has proven to be a significant case for this study because of Iraq's ability and willingness 
to deceive inspectors and constantly challenge the United Nations. The Iraqi desert has 
also proven to be a great place to test the most modem and advanced U.S. and UN 
inspection and monitoring equipment. This ability to gather information on WMD 
activities in other countries will aid in preventing another Iraq before it happens. 
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Of the many documented lessons from this experience, the greatest is the need for 
international agreement, cooperation and support for these actions. The efforts of Desert 
Storm and UNSCOM probably would not have taken place had the international 
community not overwhelmingly agree to confront a hostile Iraq. The ability to counter 
nations like Iraq with overwhelming international influence is critical to preventing cases 
like Iraq before they happen and defeating them once they have happened. 
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